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This article considers many commonly advanced criticisms of the adversary system.  It provides 
an analytic framework that includes the likely results of changed ethical rules and that 
distinguishes and analyzes separately two different possible goals of the system, seeking the truth 
and promoting justice.  The article is also unusual in the range of supporting materials that it 
synthesizes, which includes contributions from economic theory, psychological studies, 
philosophy, and traditional legal ethics.
The article concludes that changes in ethical codes meant to increase lawyers’ duty to promote 
the truth will have a perverse result, decreasing the accuracy of litigation.  This will occur 
because compliance with the rule will be difficult to verify, and, under these circumstances, many 
attorneys will not comply with the changed rules.  When some attorneys promote the truth and 
other do not, those who do not will have the advantage, to the detriment of the truth-finding 
functions of the courts.  
The article also concludes that encouraging lawyers to pursue justice as a goal is also likely to 
have perverse effects.  Because lawyers are less representative of society than clients, the 
collective censorship by lawyers of clients’ claims is likely to produce results inconsistent with 
democratic values or social mores.  Even where clients’ claims are inconsistent with then-
existing law, there presentation serves important law-changing functions and participatory 
values.  At best, giving lawyers the duty of scrutinizing clients’ claims creates burdens on clients. 
The article also addresses some possible alternative methods for improving the accuracy of 
litigation without creating conflicting duties for lawyers.
* I would like to thank my research assistant, Heather Bond Vargas; former colleagues at 
the University of Maryland, and especially Robert Condlin; and Andy Kaufman for helpful 
comments on this paper and on the teaching of the ethics course, which has influenced this paper 
considerably.  They are not, of course, responsible for any errors.
† Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law; Harvard A.B. magna cum 
laude (1980); Harvard J.D. magna cum laude (1985).
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Recently, and in a variety of areas, changes to substantive law, procedural law, and 
ethical rules have increased lawyers’ duties to disclose information.  These changes impose 
duties on lawyers to act as filters on clients’ action, limiting the ability of take the form have 
been foreshadowed and rationalized by philosophical critiques of the adversary system.  
These critiques have two flaws.  First, they are almost entirely theoretical, neglecting 
empirical evidence on such issues as client satisfaction with the legal system, the production of 
evidence in adversarial and inquisitorial processes, the problem of failure to comply with rules, 
and, perhaps most seriously, how imposing duties on lawyers to restrict client choices will cause 
special harm to the poorest and least educated clients.  
Second, they fail to consider systematically two separate goals of the legal system, truth 
and justice.  Their arguments for changes to improve the truth-producing capacity of the 
adversary system neglect the harm to justice that these changes will cause, and vice versa.  
Although the changes so far have been on the edges of the adversary system, further 
changes could lead to serious disruptions in the balance between justice and truth that we now 
have.  Consequently, it is imperative to consider seriously and systematically how attempts to 
increase lawyers’ obligations to control their clients affects the truth-producing capacity of the 
adversary system, its ability to achieve justice, and the ability of clients, particularly the poor and 
ill-educated, to have access to justice and to have a system of justice seen to address their needs.
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II. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN RETREAT 
 Despite its fundamental status in the American system of justice,1 the adversary system is 
under attack.  Critics argue that the adversary system produces injustice, because it allows 
lawyers to conceal evidence that is harmful to their clients’ cases and argue for immoral results.  
Two of the most prominent of these critics are David Luban2 and Alan Goldman,3 who have set 
out detailed and trenchant accounts of the problems that the system poses.4
1 E.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1946); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 
857-58 (1974).  Although the adversary system is fundamental, it is generally not constitutionally 
mandated, so that lawyers may be made responsible for turning in their clients for false 
statements.  See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).  But see MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' 
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 8 (1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM].  The provision for trial by jury in civil cases, U.S. CONST. amend. VII, and 
the provision for the assistance of counsel, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, may limit the ability to have 
investigative judges.  
2 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 169 (1988) [hereinafter LUBAN, LAWYERS AND 
JUSTICE].  
3 ALAN GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 96 (1982).
4 By mentioning these two, I do not mean to ignore the contributions of others.  For 
example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, as part of a symposium on the adversary system, has argued 
that postmodernist ideas invalidate the adversary approach. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble 
with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.  5 
(1996).  Closely examined, though, as Monroe H. Freedman observes, she only argues for the 
consideration of other alternatives, not identifying a particular approach that she believes would 
work better. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. & MARY L. 
REV.  63, 67 (1996) (citing Menkel-Meadow, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 11-12).   Moreover, 
her arguments rely on Luban’s, see id. at 5 n.2 (including a “see generally” cite to Luban’s The 
Good Lawyer). 
Other contributions to the field largely endorse the contributions of Luban and Goldman.  
See W. Bradley Wendel, Book Review, Professional Roles and Moral Agency: Ethics for 
Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life, 89 GEO. L.J. 667 & n.4 
(2001) (reviewing ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF 
ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)) (citing Luban and Goldman first in his list of 
authorities in the area of legal ethics).
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These criticisms have been enormously influential.5  In several areas, including the Model 
Rules governing lawyers’ ethical practices, federal statutes, and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the recent trend is to broaden disclosure of formerly confidential information.  Thus, 
in 2003, the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct modified the 
scope of a lawyer’s discretion6 to disclose to encompass non-criminal acts that do not involve 
imminent risks of death or bodily harm,7 as well as fraud or crimes causing financial loss.8
Moreover, other arguments have been less sweeping than those of Luban and Goldman.  
For example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, as part of a symposium on the adversary system, has 
argued that postmodernist ideas invalidate the adversary approach. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
supra.  Closely examined, though, as Monroe H. Freedman observes, she only argues for the 
consideration of other alternatives, not identifying a particular approach that she believes would 
work better. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. & MARY L. 
REV.  63, 67 (1996) (citing Menkel-Meadow, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 11-12).
Other critics of the adversary system, such as Richard Wasserstrom, also advance 
concerns about the special nature of lawyers as professionals.  These raise some special issues 
that I will discuss later.  See infra p. 58 & n. 190.  Some argue for broader discretion for lawyers 
to disclose.  See Simon, infra note 6.  Because an argument for lawyer discretion is less radical 
than the critiques of Goldman and Luban, I will not address it a length separately. 
5 They have been heavily relied upon by more recent critics of the adversary system.  See 
supra n. 4.  See also, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 n.1 (1996) (using a “see 
generally” cite to Luban’s The Good Lawyer); John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyering in a Hybrid 
Adversary System, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45 n.4 (1996) (citing Luban’s Lawyers and Justice:  
An Ethical Study, supra note 2, as an example of the “intense debate” over the adversary system).  
6 William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090
(1988).
7 Compare MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.6(b)(2) (2003), at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6.html with MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 1.6(b)(2) (2003); see MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.6(b)(3) 
(2003) (adopted August 2003).
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Earlier changes have expanded the duty to reveal past presentation of false evidence.9
Controversial issues of corporate legal ethics in the Sorbanes-Oxley act10 and the SEC’s 
implementing regulations11 have also recently brought the broader issues of legal ethics to the 
fore.  Although these changes are in the area of corporate disclosure, they can be expected to 
influence the further administrative and judicial debate over the adversary system.  The 1993 
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 increased the mandatory disclosure required 
of parties and attorneys.12  The 1983 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 
prohibited lawsuits advanced for an improper purpose, even if they are well-supported in fact and 
law.13
8 Compare MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.6(b)(3) (2003), at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6.html with MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 1.6(b)(3) (2002).
9 Compare MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3.3(a)(4) (1983) (duty to 
correct presentation of false evidence); ABA Comm. On Professional Ethics and Grievances, 
Formal Opinion 87-353 (1987) (same) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102 
(1980) (no description of such a duty).
10 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 307, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
11 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Release 
No. 34-47276; Ic-25929 (January 29, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8185.htm (last visited September 8, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 205).
12 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 431 (1993).
13 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 197 (1983).  The 
1993 amendments to rule 11 decreased the consequences of failure to comply with rule 11.  See
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 422-23 (1993).  At the 
same time, they provided a new duty to disclose information with respect to facts pled with 
particularity.  Id.  More recent amendments have deleted this requirement.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(1); Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 18, 57 
(1999).
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Unfortunately, the debate over the adversary system has been surprisingly narrow in the 
scope of issues it has considered.  The critics of the adversary system and the rules they have 
influenced have a strongly deontological and individualistic bent.  That is, they focus on the 
lawyers’ conduct to the exclusion of the consequences that different rules for lawyers’ behavior 
have on their clients and on the system of justice.14  To some extent, the defenders of an 
adversary system of also ignored these considerations, focusing instead on the assumed need for 
a strong attorney-client relationship.15
This narrow focus has impaired the quality of the debate.  As one observer in 1996 
summarized then-recent changes by saying that “in principle our legal system has begun the shift 
away from the adversarial model of justice; this movement, however, is taking place in a 
haphazard manner without much study or guidance.”16  Nothing has happened in the subsequent 
years to alter this judgment.
This article starts with the premise that a decision over ethical rules must consider the 
consequences of those rules and the endogenous psychological preferences of those subjected to 
the rules.  As a result, it generates different and important conclusions about how the system 
works and the desirability of some of its features.
14
 This may result from the intellectual division of labor among the three groups of people 
likely to address the area:  lawyers, philosophers, and social scientists.  Neither philosophers nor 
lawyers are empiricists; neither lawyers nor social scientists tend to worry about what ought to 
happen, rather than what actually happens; and neither social scientists nor philosophers have the 
experience with the legal system that would create skepticism about the willingness of lawyers to 
follow rules.
15 See, e.g., FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 8.
16 John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyering in a Hybrid Adversary System, 38 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 45, 46 (1996).  
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 9
The most significant consequence that the critics of the adversary system omit is the 
limited effectiveness of a duty to disclose.  The critics’ posited requirement of an ethical duty to 
promote truth is important only because of the limitations of the present system on discovering 
truth.  The attempt to create duties for lawyers is an implicit recognition of the weakness of the 
present system in discovering truth.  
Unfortunately, that very weakness means that lawyers and clients will succeed in evading 
new requirements.  Trying to require lawyers to promote truth and justice may actually reduce the 
ability of the legal system to produce truth and justice.17  Those attorneys and clients who ignore 
the rules requiring disclosure of adverse information will benefit from those rules, because their 
rule-abiding opponents will disclose harmful facts without receiving the benefit of reciprocal 
disclosure from the attorneys who do not follow the rules requiring disclosure and their clients.  
The adverse impact of such changes is likely to be concentrated on the poor and those with less 
access to the legal system, because they will have less ability to select attorneys willing to ignore 
the rules.  
A secondary criticism of the adversary system is the argument that the failure to require 
directly non-adversarial conduct of lawyers will contribute to the worsening of ethical standards 
of lawyers.  These critics overlook the true constraint on lawyers, which is the structure of the 
adversary system.  This system requires lawyers to present their claims in terms of arguments that 
appeal to unbiased judges and jurors.  The ethical structure of the adversary system resembles a 
discourse-based ethics such as that suggested by Jürgen Habermas, in which procedural 
17 Contra Lasso Rogelio, Gladiators Be Gone: The New Disclosure Rules Compel a 
Reexamination of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L. REV. 479, 511 (1995).
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considerations about the circumstances in which ethical rules are developed replace a substantive 
ethical code.18  Moreover, the need to think in terms of justice encourages lawyers to cultivate 
ethical thinking.19
Other advantages of the adversary system are largely neglected in its assessment by critics 
of the system and many of its defenders.  Critics of the adversary system neglect the 
consequences of providing additional powers to the lawyers’ perspective.  A system in which 
representatives of the parties assume judicial powers to decide whether clients’ claims should be 
pressed privileges versions of justice favored by those representatives.20  Moreover, such a 
system will affect these clients not only in their presentation of individual cases, but also in their 
ability to change the law.21
An additional, neglected advantage of the adversary system is the increased satisfaction 
participants in such a system have with the system.  This is especially felt by those who lose their 
cases,22 and this satisfaction helps maintain voluntary compliance with legal decisions.  Such 
preferences exist even among people who are not citizens in or residents of the United States and 
18 See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 264 (1996) [hereinafter 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS] (arguing that “the communicative and participatory 
rights that are constitutive for democratic opinion- and will- formation acquire a privileged 
position”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION:  REMARKS ON DISCOURSE 
ETHICS 1-2 (1993)  [hereinafter HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION]. 
19 See infra p. 74.
20 HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION, supra note 18, at 12.
21 See infra page 58 & n. 192.
22 See infra pp. 39-42 & nn. 124-134.
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other common-law countries that already practice the adversary system, so these preferences 
constitute an important, independent reason for adoption of an adversary system.
The subsequent material will consider these issues in more detail.
III. LAWYERS’ ETHICS WITHIN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
A. The Adversary System and Its Critics 
 In the adversary system, the lawyer’s goal is to serve her client.  Each lawyer provides 
evidence to support her side.  The constraints on the lawyer’s role are primarily procedural limits 
on what the lawyer can do in promoting her client’s interest.23  The lawyer has a duty to avoid 
putting forward false information herself24, but has no general duty to promote truth, justice, or 
the other side’s interests.
23 Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth:  An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 
(1975) (“The business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible without violating the 
law.”).  See also, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (“The duty of a 
lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same:  to represent his client zealously 
within the bounds of the law.”).  The Model Rules do not expressly carry forward this obligation, 
but some argue that it should be understood.  See MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 72 (1990) [hereinafter, FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS].
(Professor Freedman has since written an updated version with a co-author, MONROE FREEDMAN 
& ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 72 (2002), but I prefer to rely on the earlier, 
work of which he was sole author in case statements in the later edition might be thought to 
represent the work of his co-author.)
24 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(4) (1980) (prohibiting the 
lawyer from "knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence"); MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(5) (prohibiting the lawyer from knowingly making a false 
statement of law or fact); MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.2(d) (1983) 
(prohibiting the lawyer from assisting in illegal or fraudulent conduct); MODEL RULE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3.3 (1983) (prohibiting the lawyer from making a false statement 
of material fact or law or offering evidence known to be false); MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 4.1 (1983) (prohibiting the lawyer from making a false statement of fact or law 
even in non-adversarial settings).
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Defenders of the system have argued that the adversary system fully informs court.  
Although each side will advance the evidence that promote its view on the ultimate merits,25 all 
relevant evidence will help one side or the other, so the court will receive all relevant 
information.26  Because each side has no general duty to disclose facts that harm that party, both 
parties have a incentive to seek out facts, which will make it more likely that all the facts will be 
discovered.27  Defenders of the system argue that the adversary system avoids prejudgment of 
cases.  “An adversary presentation seems to be the only effective means for combating this 
natural tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known.”28
Critics of the system have two separate objections.  First, they fear that the absence of a 
duty to disclose information that undercuts her client’s case will interfere with the system’s 
ability to produce the results required by the substantive law.  For example, because a defense 
lawyer can conceal her knowledge that the plaintiff’s injuries are much more serious than the 
plaintiff realizes, the plaintiff will settle a case for far less than he ought.29  Thus, Judge Marvin 
25 See Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries 
Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 257, 260 (1996).
26 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
27 See Steven Matthews & Andrew Postlewait, Quality Testing and Disclosure, 16 RAND J. 
ECON. 328 (1985) (mandating disclosure will decrease the amount of information available); 
David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37-58 
(1979) (arguing that, when noncompliance would be profitable because undetected or 
undersanctioned, it is 'surprisingly difficult to construct' a categorical argument for voluntary 
compliance).
28 Lon Fuller, The Adversary System in TALKS ON AMERICAN Law 39-40 (Harold Berman 2d 
ed., 1971).  See also Lon Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility:  Report of the 
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
29 Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 155, at 115.
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Frankel's The Search for Truth:  An Umpireal View, argues that lawyers in litigation should be 
bound to the same standards that SEC rule 10b-5 requires of securities law attorneys.30  This 
view was reflected in the 1993 mandatory disclosure amendments to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(a).31  This objection challenges the ability of the adversary system to produce truth.
Second, critics of the adversary system fear that the lawyer’s single-minded goal of 
serving the client’s interests will allow the client to obtain a result to which the client is legally 
entitled, but which is not just.  For example, a lawyer will allow the client to plead the statute of 
limitations to bar a just claim.  Goldman and Luban emphasize this criticism, although they are 
also concerned with the withholding of evidence.32  A scheme of truth promotion will not satisfy 
these critics of the adversary system, because some claims that are factually true and legally valid 
may nonetheless be unjust.  These views are reflected in the “proper purpose” requirement added 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which attempts to bar even legally justified claims or 
defenses if advanced for an improper purpose.
Critics of the adversary system attack the empirical foundations of the system.  Luban 
criticizes this as “untested speculations from the armchair.” 33  Simon, who studied the ethics of 
30 See Frankel, supra note 23, at 1057-58 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974)).
31 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 431 (1993).
32 See supra nn. 2-3. 
33 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 72.  See also David Luban, 
Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801 (1998).  In other contexts, 
Luban has conceded some advantages for the adversary system.  
The institutional strength of the adversary system is that giving 
parties sole responsibility for presenting their own cases arranges 
incentives so that every point of view gets investigated and 
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public interest lawyers claims, “[T]he proponents of this theory have never been able to 
formulate an adequate account of it.  Their theory has rested on the notion that opposing biases 
somehow neutralize each other, rather than simply creating confusion.  But they have never 
explained why this is so.”34  Critics could also argue that the necessity that lawyers argue for one 
side might explain why they are less likely to perceive facts that favor the other side, but does not 
itself justify a lawyer’s withholding information that the lawyer knows to be harmful to her 
client.
Critics further argue that, in reality, the expense of finding evidence will limit the 
information the court receives.35  Moreover, blundering lawyers will not find evidence that they 
presented as fully and sympathetically as possible.  From the 
standpoint of decisional accuracy, partisan advocacy ensures that 
salient arguments are not overlooked. From the standpoint of 
respect for human variety, giving full voice to all positions is more 
just. We may put it the other way around: to exclude or silence 
voices makes the human world less just. Whatever harmony results 
is an illusion, a suppression of conflict - and justice is conflict.
The distinctive virtue of the adversary system lies in its ability to 
elicit more voices and more input than alternative systems. Even 
critics of the adversary system concede the importance of this 
virtue.
David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary : The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 217 (2003).
34 Roy D. Simon, Jr., Fee Sharing Between Lawyers and Public Interest Groups, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1069, 1140 (1989) (public interest groups adhere to high ethical standards, as measured by 
the extremely low rate at which such groups are sanctioned).
35 Id. This is especially an obstacle where expert witnesses are involved, because of the 
expense of retaining them and supplying them with information on which they can base their 
opinions.
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should.  Because the poor will have fewer resources with which to find good lawyers and finance 
their search for truth, the adversary system favors the wealthy.
As Luban observes, the defenders of existing rules simply repeat the idea of an adversary 
system.  For example, in Monroe Freedman's justification of participating in the deception of the 
court, he observes that "[t]he attorney functions in an adversary system based upon the 
presupposition that the most effective means of determining truth is to present to a judge and jury 
a clash between proponents of conflicting views."36  Nowhere in his original work does 
Freedman examine the validity of that presupposition.37  Luban also suggests that the success of 
inquisitorial systems shows that modifying the American system to include a general duty for 
lawyers to promote the truth would improve the system.38
These arguments are all somewhat theoretical.  They depend for their persuasive power 
on assumptions about reality.  Does the incentive to discover more data that the adversary system 
provides outweigh the harm caused to the truth-finding process from the withholding of relevant 
36
 See Monroe Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1966) [hereinafter Freedman, The Three 
Hardest Questions] (emphasis added).
37 Thus, as Luban observes, “it is misleading to call the justification by the adversary system 
an argument.  It is more like a presuppos[i]tion accepted by all parties before the arguments 
begin.”  LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 54.  For criticism see John T. Noonan, 
The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966); 
John T. Noonan, Professional Ethics or Personal Responsibility?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 363 (1977)
[hereinafter Noonan, Professional Ethics].  In his more recent work with a co-author, Freedman 
addresses many of these deficiencies.  See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra n. 23, at 36-39.
38 Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 155, at 93.  See also John Langbein, 
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).  Others have reached 
conclusions contrary to Langbein’s.  Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure—Reflections on the 
Comparisons of the Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REV 409, 420-21 (1960).
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 16
information?  Those assumptions are difficult to verify directly.  However, as the immediately 
following section shows, psychological, economic, and social science research all provide some 
support for the adversary system.  Such data, while helpful, are not the complete story, because 
they assume the willingness of participants in the system to comply with the system’s rules.  The 
next subsequent section develops the idea that lawyers and clients will not always comply with 
the rules; under those circumstances, the advantages of the adversary system are even greater.  
B. Promoting Truth As an Alternative to the Adversary System  
1. The Adversary System and the Production of Truth 
 There are several respects in which social science research supports the adversary system.  
First, economic analysis shows that mandatory disclosure rules generally decrease disclosure, by 
creating incentives not to carry out the investigations that may then have to be turned over to 
another side.39  This supports the argument that privileges of confidentiality may be necessary to 
encourage parties to discover information about their own cases.
Economic analysis also suggests that the adversary system will work better than an 
inquisitorial system.40  The model, although abstract, takes into account the competition between 
the parties in producing evidence, the burdens of producing evidence, the tendency of the parties 
39 Matthews & Postlewaite, supra note 27, at 330.  Their analysis expressly concerns the 
analysis of monopoly sellers of goods, which is analogous to the issue of someone attempting to 
sell (settle) a case.  Id. at 339.  It assumes that demand does not depend significantly on income; 
under these circumstances when someone seeks information, the seller will want to provide it.  
40 See Froeb & Kobayashi, supra note 25, at 269.  See also Hyun Song Shin, Adversarial 
and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration, 29 RAND J. ECON. 378 (1998) (concluding that even 
if it decision makers are, on average, as well informed as the two parties, the adversarial 
procedure is superior because of its ability to allocate the burden of proof in an effective manner, 
and thereby extract the maximal informational content from apparently inconclusive contests).
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to produce to the jury only favorable evidence, and the bias and naiveté of the decision maker.41
The authors conclude, “The net effect of the adversarial system is to mitigate the prior bias of the 
jury.”42
Second, empirical psychological research comparing the adversarial system with its 
inquisitorial rivals supports the adversary system.  A pathbreaking set of experiments, since 
confirmed in many respects, compared four different procedures:  a client-selected adversarial 
investigator and advocate, like that existing in the United States; a court-appointed inquisitorial 
investigator; two court-appointed adversarial investigators and advocates; and two court-
appointed inquisitorial investigators, in which each inquisitor, while not aligned with a party, 
presented only one party's case to the court.43
The adversarial system like that used in the United States was best in all three respects 
tested.  It had the greatest ability to cancel out initial bias of the decision maker.44  It was best at 
41 Id. at 270.
42 Id. at 269.
43 JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:  A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975). An earlier version of this work, with an additional co-author, was John 
Thibault, Lauren S. Wlker, & E. Allen Lind, Adversary Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 836 (1972), but was criticized on methodological grounds in Mirjan H. Dameska, 
Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 1083 (1975), and 
Peter Brett, Legal Decisionmaking and Bias:  A Critique of an Experiment, 45 U. COLO. L. REV.
1 (1973).  See also E. Allen Lind, John Thibaut, & E. Allen Walker, Discovery and Presentation 
of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1973).  Much 
of this work is summarized in the context of alternative dispute resolution in Nancy A. Welsh, 
Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution:  Insights from Procedural and Social Jujstice 
Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52-53 (2004).
44 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 43, at 41-52.  The American-style adversary system 
proved best even with French experimenters and subjects.  Id. at 52-53.  See also John Thibaut et 
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canceling out internal biases resulting from the sequencing of presentation.45  And, it best 
compensated for sampling error in the discovered facts, so that random variation in the facts 
originally known to the attorney had less effect on the results of the litigation under the adversary 
system than under competing systems.46
Thibaut and Walker concluded that their investigations “have produced generally 
encouraging information about the capacity of the adversary system to protect the weaker party 
and to moderate decision-maker bias.”47   They also conclude, “It is perhaps the main finding of 
the body of our research, therefore, that for litigation the class of procedures commonly called 
‘adversary’ is clearly superior.”48
Although the adversary system has one defect discovered by these investigations—for a 
variety of reasons, witnesses tend to provide more support for the case of the side that calls 
them49—it was superior overall.  Moreover, this superiority may explain Italy's recent shift from 
al., Comment, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV.
386, 391-401 (1972).  
45 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 43, at 62-63, 66 (describing “the capacity of an 
adversary system to generate balanced final judgments under conditions that afford both 
advocates fair access to their most effective resources”); MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 208 (1978). 
46 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 43, at 39.  See also Lind, supra note 86, at 1135, 1141-
43.
47 Id.  at 54.
48 Id. at 118.
49 Neil Vidmar & Nancy M. Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on Witnesses' 
Communication of Evidence and the Assessments of Adjudicators, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 888 (1983). Moreover, adversary attorneys' interviews with witnesses tend to bias their 
testimony; inquisitorial interviews do not.  Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial 
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its inquisitorial system towards a more adversarial system.50  As even some advocates for 
American adoption of inquisitorial ideas concede, other continental systems have also been 
criticized for lack of adversariness.51
Despite the combination of several types of research, Luban dismisses the work of 
Thibaut and Walker on the superiority of the adversarial system as “inconclusive” without much 
discussion.52  He does suggest that “there are inherent limitations on how closely such 
experiments are done.”53  However, these laboratory experiments probably understate the 
advantage of the adversarial system.  Because all the data were known to the experimenters, 
participants in the experiments would have been caught if they cheated.  Real life is not so 
simple.  As the next section suggests, the problem of limited compliance with ethical rules 
requiring the disclosure makes the adversary system even more attractive.
2. The Ineffectiveness of Duties of Disclosure in the 
Face of Lawyers’ and Clients’ Disobedience of Rules  
 The ethical defects the adversary system are often described as a result of lawyers’ 
adversarial attitudes or their willingness to adopt a rule of role differentiation, in which what is 
Procedures and Testimonial Evidence: Effects of Lawyer's Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 329 (1980). Finally, judges tend to view the witnesses for a 
side as being more supportive of that side. Vidmar & Laird, supra, at 893-95.
50 Lawrence J. Fassler, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of 
Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 245-78 (1991); 
Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 99, at 1-3.
51 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 99 & n.56.
52 Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 155, at 93 & n.37.  
53 Id.
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ethically impermissible for ordinary citizens becomes ethically permissible for lawyers.  
However, lawyers are merely responding to the demands of their clients.  If clients sought to 
promote the truth, we would not need an ethical rule requiring lawyers to do so:  the requirement 
that lawyers follow clients' legitimate instructions would suffice.  
Clients frequently want to lie or conceal evidence where it will help them.  Where the 
truth is obvious, an ethical duty to disclose is unnecessary.  Thus, a duty to disclose makes a 
difference only where the opposing party’s other means for discovering evidence failed.  The sort 
of evidence likely to trigger a duty to disclose is evidence that only the lawyer and client know, 
such as statements from a client to his lawyer and documents from a party's files.  In many of the 
famous cases of failure to disclose—Dalkon Shield,54 theophyllin,55  benlate,56 tobacco57, 
asbestos58; employment discrimination59—lawyers have merely been following their clients’ 
wishes.  In other cases, as Texaco’s apparent destruction of evidence in a race discrimination 
54 SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE: ONE JUDGE'S BATTLE TO 
EXPOSE THE DEADLY DALKON SHIELD I.U.D. 71-75 (1985).
55 Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1058, 
1074 (Wash. 1993).
56 In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 918 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (fining du Pont 
$115 million for withholding information), reversed, 99 F.3d 363 (11th Cir. 1996).
57 The Deposition:  Cigarette Defector Says CEO Lied to Congress About View of Nicotine, 
WALL ST. J., at A1 (January 26, 1996) (alleging perjury by corporate officers and "charg[ing] that 
B&W in-house lawyers repeatedly hid potentially damaging scientific research, including altering 
minutes of a scientific meeting").
58 E.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 141, 413 S.E.2d 630 
(1992).
59 Alison Frankel, Tale of the Tapes, AMERICAN LAWYER 64 (March 1997).
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case shows, clients can and will destroy evidence without the lawyers’ knowledge.60  Indeed, 
under existing Model Rule 1.2(d) and like rules, they may be right (from their selfish 
perspective) to conceal information.61
But the instances in which a duty to disclose is desirable imply a limitation on the 
successfulness of regulating lawyers.62  A duty to disclose is desirable in precisely those cases in 
which it will not be effective.  If clients continue to want to conceal evidence under those 
circumstances, then they will seek out lawyers to effectuate those desires or simply leave lawyers 
uninformed.63  It does not require believing that lawyers are less honest than any other group in 
society to believe that clients who want unethical lawyers will be able to get them.64  In the latter 
60 See N.Y. Times 
61 Model Code 7-102(A)(4) (a lawyer cannot "knowingly use perjured testimony or false 
evidence"); Model Rule 3.3 (a lawyer cannot make a false statement of material fact or law or 
offer evidence known to be false, and must take reasonable remedial measures, even if the 
information is privileged). Cf. DR 7-102(A)(7); MR 1.2(d) (both prohibiting the lawyer's 
participation in the creation of false evidence). Compare DR 7-102(A)(5) (prohibiting knowingly 
making a false statement of law or fact) with MR 4.1 & 1.2(d) (prohibiting the lawyer from 
making a false statement of fact or law to a third person and prohibiting a lawyer's assisting a 
client in a criminal or fraudulent act through failing to disclose a material fact).
62 Professor Molot agrees that individual attorneys are largely helpless to alter the existing 
situation.  Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil 
Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 1013-1014 (1998).  However, he believes that social changes 
would enable attorneys to be more responsive to seeking justice.  Id.   For the reasons set forth in 
the text, I believe that such changes would eliminate many of the advantages that the adversary 
system provides for truth finding and party satisfaction with the legal system.   
63 See Clearing Texaco’s Lawyers, AMERICAN LAWYER (Sept.-Oct. 1997).
64 See, e.g., After the Whistle Blows, WASH. POST, at A18 (December 30, 1995) (fraud in 
"lab run by Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist David Baltimore"); Conniving Charities, 
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL. (R.I.), at A10 (July 1, 1995) (fraud of executives of United Way and other 
charities); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 366, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
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case, a lie is presented, but the lawyer is unaware of the lie and so cannot prevent it.65  Moreover, 
the lawyers’ inability to ascertain the truth or justice of clients’ claims will cause lawyers to carry 
out their clients’ wishes, even in instances in which the lawyers would not, if the lawyers knew 
all the facts.66
Consequently, a sensible analysis of the effects of a rule increasing duties to disclose 
requires considering the problem of disobedience to such rules.  The rest of this section of the 
article does this by considering the empirical and theoretical evidence on the frequency of 
concealment in violation of rules requiring disclosure, the consequences of differing rates of 
obedience to rules requiring disclosure, and the approach of non-judicial institutions promoting 
an adversary system to create truth.
a) The Frequency with which Lawyers and Clients 
Disobey Disclosure Rules 
 Because lawyers and clients do not want to admit to violating the rules, we do not know 
exactly how often people withhold evidence in violation of those rules.67  However, the failure to 
disclose evidence from one party's files is difficult to detect, so the possible sanctions for being 
(businesspeople intentionally failed to warn of asbestos-related diseases, despite advice from 
doctors). 
65 Noonan argues that professional ethics can abolish the "presentation of perjury" in the 
courtroom.  Noonan, Professional Ethics, supra note 37, at 365.  As this analysis shows, that is 
simply incorrect.  At best only the lawyer's knowledge of perjury can be abolished.  Noonan’s 
equation of the two allows him to avoid answering the hard question about how much an increase 
in perjury he is willing to accept as the price of a reduction in lawyer’s knowledge of perjury.
66 Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manque, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 127 (2002).
67 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1151-68 (1992).
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caught provide little incentive to disclose harmful evidence.68  “[A] victimized litigant will 
generally have no effective way to overcome a skillful spoliator's assertion that all relevant 
documents have been produced.”69  The evidentiary hurdles to showing discovery abuse70 and the 
68 See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2240 (1989) (discussing incentives 
to construe requests to exclude the smoking gun); Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Improve Judicial 
Controls over Pretrial Development of Civil Actions:  Model Rules for Case Management and 
Sanctions, 1981 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 875, 883 (similar).  Interestingly enough, Professor 
Hazard was later paid to endorse such concealment.  See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sleazy in Seattle, 
AMERICAN LAWYER April, 1994, at 5 (discussing Professor Hazard’s role in Washington State 
Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1058, 1074 (Wash. 1993)).
69 Charles Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for 
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 796 (1991).  Because of “the low risk of 
reporting and punishment,” “disciplinary rules and subornation statutes can do little to control . . 
. witness coaching” through suggestion.  Richard Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 27 (1995).  Coaching through suggestion is described in the “anatomy of a 
murder” situation, in which a lawyer, by explaining the law, leads his client to understand what 
facts the client must claim existed in order to have a defense.  See ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY 
OF A MURDER 32 (1958) (Traver is the pen name of John D. Voelker, a justice on the Michigan 
Supreme Court).  For discussion of the ethics of the Anatomy of a Murder lecture, see DEBORAH  
RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 320-21 (2d ed. 1995); GEOFFREY HAZARD ET AL., THE 
LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 443-44 (2d ed. 1994); DEBORAH  RHODE, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY:  ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 212 (1994); FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra n. 23 at 156-58; MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 15 (1980).
70 See Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Co., 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (requiring 
proof of discovery abuse by “clear and convincing” evidence).
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reluctance of judges to award compensatory sanctions71 mean that the rewards for dishonesty are 
not counterbalanced by great sanctions imposed on the few who are caught.72
The anecdotal evidence from case law shows exactly what one would suspect from this 
pattern of easy concealment and low penalties, that evidence will often not be disclosed, even 
after express requests pursuant to court rules that require disclosure.73  One author concludes, 
71 See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 69, at 796-97 (“Nor are judges disposed to press intimations 
of unethical conduct when the alleged impropriety has not caused any lasting harm. The judge 
who is overseeing the discovery process (or, more likely, the magistrate) will likely tell the 
victim's lawyer, ‘You've got the evidence.  Now get on with it.’"); Barbara J. Gorham, Note, 
Fisons: Will It Tame the Beast of Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 765, 786 (1994); John 
W. Heiderscheit, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions in the Ninth Circuit:  The Collapse of the 
Deterrence Goal, 68 OR. L. REV. 57, 77 (1989)
72 See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals To Amend 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 190 (1992) (“[B]ecause discovery 
abuse is mostly rational, deliberate, economically motivated behavior, efforts to eliminate such 
behavior must focus on the incentives that lead lawyers and their clients to engage in it.”).  
73 Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1058, 
1074 (Wash. 1993) (drug companies); Harre v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(fraudulent testimony by expert latter indicted for obstruction of justice, see Harre v. A.H. Robins 
Co., 866 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1989)); Grand Jury Looks at Dupont Actions:  Investigation 
Involves Allegedly Withheld Test Data about Benlate Fungicide, ORLANDO SENTINEL at B5 
(October 19, 1995) (chemical companies); In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 918 F. Supp. 
1524 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (fining du Pont $115 million for withholding information), reversed, 99 
F.3d 363 (11th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3767 (May 8, 1997) (No. 96-
1777).; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 141, 413 S.E.2d 630 (1992) 
(asbestosis); Kathleen P. Browe, Comment, A Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo 
Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 751 (1994).   
Corporations now frequently destroy documents as part of a regular practice, hoping to 
conceal information while barring juries from inferring that the destroyed documents would have 
been evidence against them.  See Dale A. Oesterle,  A Private Litigant’s Remedies for an 
Opponent’s Inappropriate Destruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1983).  
This is because a claim of spoliation ordinarily requires “that the spoliator was on notice of the 
claim or potential claim at the time of the destruction.”  Robert L. Tucker, The Flexible Doctrine 
of Spoliation of Evidence:  Cause of Action, Defense, Evidentiary Presumption, and Discovery 
Sanction, 27 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 67, 79 (1995).
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“The instances where car manufacturers and their lawyers have been found to conceal relevant 
information despite specific discovery requests and court orders are too numerous to name.”74
Even public prosecutors, who are not directly responsible to clients, frequently ignore their 
constitutional duties75 to disclose.76  Because private lawyers depend on clients for gainful 
employment, they have even more reason to withhold evidence.77
In addition to the evidence of cases in which withholding was attempted and failed, there 
is indirect evidence suggesting that concealment of evidence is common.  A survey of litigators 
showed that in large cases, in 50% of the settled cases and in 33% of the fully tried cases, at least 
one side believed that the other had failed to uncover significant evidence.78 Presumably the 
responding lawyers would have claimed that the reason for this failure to discover significant 
evidence was the absence of a proper discovery request, rather than dishonesty on the part of the 
74 Rogelio, supra note 17, at 526 n.96 (collecting cases).
75 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
76 Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 430-31 (1992) 
(prosecutors ignore ethical rules because harmless-error analysis allows them to get away with 
it).  Luban observed, "[A]n unscrupulous prosecutor needs to get caught before [a decision 
requiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence] does the defendant any good, and it is a matter of 
conjecture how often the prosecution gets away with undisclosed [exculpatory] material."   David 
Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1737 (1993).  However, he 
fails to realize that the same problem exists for his proposed requirements of disclosure in civil 
cases, exacerbated by the attorney’s and client’s financial interest in non-disclosure.
77 Simon cites the more modest role differentiation expected of prosecutors as a reason that 
the same standards can be applied to private lawyers.  Simon, supra note 6, at 1091.   Simon’s 
argument fails to consider the possibility that the prosecutor’s reduced responsibility to “clients” 
explains the imposition of greater duties on the prosecutor.
78 Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery:  Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal 
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 870-71.
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responding attorney.  However, the failure of counsel to draft adequate discovery requests in so 
many high stakes cases would be inexplicable.  Furthermore, those who have been caught failing 
to respond to discovery have generally used the argument that the opposing side’s discovery 
requests were improperly phrased.79  The courts’ rejection of these claims80 suggests that similar, 
undetected refusals to respond are in fact not justified.81
Comparative evidence also exists to suggest that a rule requiring disclosure would be 
frequently evaded.  Florida, in contrast to other states, has for years ethically mandated that 
lawyers disclose clients’ attempts to commit any crime.82  Efforts to obtain an incorrect verdict 
through presentation of false evidence would be encompassed by this, yet the rule has never been 
cited in this connection.83  This suggests that there is simply no effect from a rule requiring 
disclosure.
79 See Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 
1058, 1074 (Wash. 1993); Grand Jury Looks at Dupont Actions Investigation Involves Allegedly 
Withheld Test Data about Benlate Fungicide, ORLANDO SENTINEL at B5 (October 19, 1995); In 
re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 918 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (fining du Pont $115 
million for withholding information), reversed, 99 F.3d 363 (11th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. 
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3767 (May 8, 1997) (No. 96-1777).
80 See supra note 79.
81 See supra note 68.
82 FLA. S. CT. ETHICAL RULE 4-1.6(b) (2004) (based on ABA MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.6(b) (2004) (“(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A 
lawyer shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  (1) 
to prevent a client from committing a crime; or (2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm 
to another.”) (emphasis in original)).
83 Indeed, cases in Florida apply the statutory privilege, Fla. Stat. § 90.502 (2003), without 
discussing the more limited ability to conceal provided by the court’s ethical rules.  See, e.g., 
Horning-Keating v. State, 777 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (Fla. App. 2001) (“To come within the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, plaintiffs ‘must allege and produce prima facie 
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 27
All this provides ample reason for concluding that many lawyers would ignore the rule.  
Indeed, because general duties to disclose evidence are vaguer and therefore easier to evade than 
specific disclosure requests in discovery, we can expect violations of general duties to promote 
truth to be even more widespread.84
Even if people honestly attempt to provide harmful facts, they will often fail to do so.  
Because even lawyers acting in good faith often fail to appreciate the significance of facts for the 
other side, deciding when a lawyer has acted in bad faith will be very difficult.  The uncertainties 
in this process may well wisely be resolved in favor of a lawyer accused in acting of bad faith, 
but this necessary generosity further undermines the enforceability of the standard already 
difficult to enforce, because of the ease of keeping the inculpatory evidence concealed.  All this 
suggests that disobedience to such a rule would be widespread.
evidence that [the client] affirmatively sought the advice of counsel to procure a fraud’ . . . The 
[evidence presented] does not satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of showing probable cause that a fraud 
was perpetrated or planned and that the attorney-client communications were in furtherance of 
the fraud.”) (quoting Jones v. General Motors Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338-39 (M.D. Fla. 
1998)) (alterations by the Horning-Keating court).  See also State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 654 So. 
2d 1184, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), aff’d, State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 538 
(Fla. 1997), on remand, 758 So. 2d 1131, 1135-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (approving 
dismissal of criminal charges of fraudulent failure to disclose, brought against an attorney for 
failing to inform insurer of the client’s allegedly fraudulent activities; no discussion of conflict 
between Florida laws).
84 The widespread failure to disclose in a non-adversary context is demonstrated by the 
recent failures of disclosure within the corporate reporting system.  See generally Deborah L. 
Rhode & Paul D. Patton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. &  FIN. 9 (2002) 
(discussing the role played by various lawyers in misconduct by Enron managers); Rebecca 
Blumenstein & Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Fraud was Widespread, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, 
at A3 (WorldCom’s lawyers participated in a “breakdown in the ... the company’s corporate 
governance structure”).
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b) The Consequences of Disobedience 
 If all lawyers ignored an ethical rule to promote truth, we would have the precise situation 
that we are in now.  However, if, as would probably happen, some lawyers follow the rule and 
some lawyers do not, the results for the system of justice would be even worse.  Clients of 
lawyers who obey the rules of disclosure will systematically suffer from disobedient lawyering 
on the other side and lose even when they ought to win.85  One side will reveal its weak points; 
the other side will not.  Under these circumstances, the judgment will likely favor the side 
concealing evidence, even though the truth is not on that side.
Empirical evidence supports this conclusion.  In experiments in which one attorney had a 
truth-promoting, "court-centered" role and the other attorney had an adversarial, "client-centered" 
role, the decision-maker received facts that were consistently biased in favor of the client of the 
client-centered attorney.86  This result occurred even though no false evidence was presented.87
Such a system not only rewards concealing evidence, it skews the legal system in favor of 
the wealthy and powerful.  When only some lawyers obey the rule, clients will seek out lawyers 
who do not follow the rules.88  The wealthy have better access to information on lawyers’ 
reputations, which will allow them to hire lawyers whose reputation suggests that they will work 
85 See supra p. 27 (discussing truth as a function of many pieces of evidence).
86 E. Allan Lind, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary 
Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139 (1973).
87 Id. at 1139; see also generally infra pp. 69.
88 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 132.  See also infra note 111.
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with clients to conceal harmful information.89  The wealthy will bid up the price of unethical 
lawyers,90 and so have systematically better access to legal advice.  Sophisticated clients, wealthy 
or not, will know that lawyers will present harmful information and therefore will not disclose 
that information to the lawyer.  Less sophisticated clients will not know this, will disclose the 
information to the lawyer, and will have it disclosed to the court.  
The poor, represented by honest public-interest lawyers,91 and the middle class, with little 
ability to carry out sophisticated searches for unethical lawyers, will be disadvantaged.  Even 
those advocating moralistic interventions by lawyers admit that “lawyers in elite firms” may lose 
“professional autonomy most,” thereby making them vulnerable to client importuning.92  Thus, a 
duty to disclose on the part of the lawyer would systematically bias the legal system in favor of 
the sophisticated and wealthy.93
This, of course, makes rules mandating disclosure harder to tolerate even for those who 
applaud their ideals.  Obviously, individual, honest lawyers are harmed.  I agree with Alan 
89 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed To Advertise:  A Market 
Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1096 & n.47 (1983).  For a discussion of 
how people with shared unlawful interests can seek each other out, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, 
CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 211 (1984).
90 Cf. Robert Frank, Can Socially Responsible Firms Survive in a Competitive Environment, 
in, CODES OF CONDUCT 86-103 (David M. Messnick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds. 1996) (students 
require higher financial rewards to accept employment that they find ethically repugnant).  
91 Simon, supra note 6, at 1110.
92 Rob Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of The 
Remains of the Day, 105 YALE L.J. 177, 203 (1995).
93 See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the 
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C.L. REV. 795, 823-26 (1991) (discussing objections of public 
interest lawyers to mandatory informal discovery).
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Goldman’s observation that honest people generally suffer an impediment in their money-making 
ability, and there is no reason to treat honest lawyers more favorably than other honest people.94
However, there are two problems with stopping the analysis at this point.  First, it is 
wrong to assume that honesty and obedience to rules are the same thing.  Second, Goldman does 
not realize that the low chance of punishment means that the lawyer and her client will recognize 
that the lawyer is sacrificing both fairness and the best interests of her client in following the 
rule.95  If not disclosing is different from dishonesty, should we adopt a rule that will benefit only 
those who do not adhere to it?
c) The Theory of Second Best and the Fallacy of a 
Little Bit of Success 
 Proponents of a rule requiring disclosure sometimes argue that the existence of apparently 
successful inquisitorial system shows that requiring more disclosure will not produce disaster for 
the American legal system.  However, the underlying assumption in this argument is that if each 
of two systems work, a combination of two systems will work, too.  This is simply incorrect.  
The theory of second best shows that if more than one condition required for optimality is not 
satisfied, the correction of flaws in some but not all of the conditions will not necessarily 
improve the outcome.96
94 Id.
95 See James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar:  Ethical Limits on Lying in Negotiation, 
1980 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 926, 927 ("[I]f the low probability of punishment 
means that many lawyers will violate the standard, the standard becomes even more difficult for 
the honest lawyer to follow, for by doing so he may be forfeiting a significant advantage for his 
client to others who do not follow the rules.").  
96 See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).  
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In the example of rules of full disclosure, we may assume for the sake of argument that 
the ideal system is one in which both sides have an obligation to promote truth and justice.  
Currently, the system gives neither side any special obligation to promote truth and justice.  It 
falls short of the ideal in two respects:  the plaintiff’s side will not promote truth and justice, and 
the defendant’s side will not promote truth and justice.  
The theory of second best tells us that moving from a system in which neither side is 
promoting truth and justice to a system in which one side is, but the other is not, may make 
things worse.97  The theory of second best does not prove that improvements to just one part of 
the system will make things worse,98 but for the reasons discussed in the preceding section a duty 
to promote the truth seems all too likely to make things worse.   
In the adversarial system, a failure to produce facts will affect both sides evenly.  An 
inquisitorial system pays a judge to conduct a separate investigation, so there is one entity under 
an unmixed duty to seek out the facts.  If some lawyers will ignore obligations to produce truth, a 
mixed system will produce bias in favor of clients who retain attorneys who ignore the rules.  
The pure adversarial system and the pure inquisitorial system will not produce this problem.  
Thus, the existence of a successful alternative to the adversary system does not imply that a 
97 For examples applying the theory of second best to legal problems, see Stephen F. 
Williams, Second Best:  The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
932 (1993); Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-
Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best-World:  The Whys and Some 
Therefores, 46 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 316 (1996); William D. Zeller, Countertrade, the 
GATT, and the Theory of Second Best, 11 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 247 (1988) 
[hereinafter Markovits, Monopoly]; Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard 
Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking:  A Generalizable Critique, a “Sociological” Account, and
Some Illustrative Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1993).
98 E.g., Williams, supra note 97, at 933.
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hybrid system that combines the inconsistent characteristics of the adversarial and the 
inquisitorial systems will be successful.99
It may seem paradoxical that attorney dishonesty should be used as a reason for tolerating 
attorney dishonesty.  However, the usual argument for failing to penalize people for doing 
something because others are doing it is that the discrimination or arbitrariness of selecting out a 
few outweighs the purpose served by the rule.100  Here, the injustice is done, not to those refusing 
to obey the rule, but to those who obey it.  The more dishonest an attorney, the more she will 
favor a rule of mandatory disclosure, because the more advantage she will derive from her 
disobedience.  The more honest an attorney, the more such a rule will cause her and her clients to 
suffer from her honesty, and the more she will oppose such a rule.  
Again, empirical evidence supports this conclusion.  The 1983 amendments to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 resulted in the rule's being used disproportionately against plaintiffs, 
and particularly disproportionately against civil rights plaintiffs.101  Creating an ethical duty to 
99 Cf. William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: 
The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 1, 35  (1992) ("Italy was not mistaken to graft adversarial procedures onto a civil law 
system: its efforts merely demonstrate that procedures cannot be adapted easily from one system 
to another.").
100 Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (arbitrary enforcement of 
petty offenses).  
101 STEPHEN BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE 
ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 57, 71 (1989) (noting "far higher rate" of 
imposition of sanctions on attorneys for plaintiffs in civil rights cases than on other plaintiffs); 
Lawrence C. Marshall, et al., Public Policy: The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 
943 (1992) (similar).  The pre-1993 version of the rule may have contributed to this by imposing 
a greater duty on those making an allegation than on those denying one. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 
advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendments to subdivisions (b) and (c), para. 6.
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promote the truth is likely to yield the same, disproportionate impact.  Moreover, a duty to 
promote the truth enforceable by adverse parties would likely create the same sort of harassment 
and satellite litigation that the 1983 version of rule 11 caused, with the same sort of 
discriminatory effect.102
d) Evidence from the Real World on the Adversary 
System 
 The academic debate on the professional ethics of lawyering neglects the effects that the 
process of selecting non-disclosing lawyers will have on this truth-producing power of the 
system.103  Indeed, Luban and Simon assert that no one genuinely searching for truth would adopt 
an adversarial system.104
102 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment ("The 
revision broadens the scope of this [certification] obligation, but places greater constraints on the 
imposition of sanctions and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions presented to the 
court."); Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance: 
Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REV. 575, 647-53 (1987) (discussing emergence of satellite 
litigation); William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1017-18 (1988) 
(same).
103 Alan Goldman recognizes that clients expect loyalty and will prefer unethical lawyers, but 
worries only about the reduction in income for ethical lawyers, not the effect of the selection of 
unethical lawyers on the truth-producing power of the system. GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 108, 
132.  Ronald J. Gilson discusses the effects of client pressure, but focuses on the decline in 
lawyers' ability to screen out "strategic" suits, not on their ability to avoid the presentation of 
false evidence. The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. 
REV. 869, 884-85 (1990). See also Bruce Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 483 (1994); Ricardo G. Cedillo & David Lopez, Document Destruction in 
Business Litigation from a Practitioner's Point-Of- View: The Ethical Rules vs. Practical 
Realities, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 637 (1989); JAMIE GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE 
SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (1989).
104 Simon, supra note 6, at 1140 & n.124; Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 
155, at 93-96.  Luban asks whether the lawyer seeking evidence would employ two adversary 
investigators to search out the evidence, but this analogy is flawed:  the lawyer is not seeking all
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Those with actual responsibility for discovering the truth disagree.  In a variety of 
contexts, the adversary system has been found necessary to promoting truth, even in situations 
where there is no inherent antagonism.  
As Luban himself concedes elsewhere, in some respects progress in the sciences is based 
on an adversarial model.105  Moreover, students of the history of science support the idea that 
one’s framework determines the facts one perceives,106 supporting the idea that the adversary 
system is necessary to minimize the effects of preconceptions about a case.107  Charles Darwin 
said, “How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some 
view if it is to be of any service.”108
Perhaps the most famous example of an artificial adversary relationship is the Roman 
Catholic Church, which found it necessary to introduce an adversary system to improve the 
integrity of its internal processes, even in situations in which there is no fundamental adversary 
relationship.  The Roman Catholic “advocatus diaboli” is created as an advocate in an adversary 
the evidence, but only the evidence favorable to his own side.  Therefore, he has no need for an 
adversary approach.
105 Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 155, at 94.  Luban does criticize the 
analogy to Popperian scientific methodology, because scientists do not use procedural rules to 
exclude probative evidence.  Id. 
106 See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS esp. 50-76 
(2d ed. 1970).
107 See supra p. 12 & n.28.  For the parallels between the history of science and legal 
systems, see HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra n.5, at 210.
108 1 MORE LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN 195 (Francis Darwin & A.C. Seward eds., 1903) 
quoted in CHARLES P. CURTIS, IT’S YOUR LAW 23 & n.30 (1954).  See also 1 FRANCIS DARWIN, 
THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN  149 (London:  John Murray 1887) (“He often said 
that no one could be a good observer unless he was an active theoriser.”).
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system to deny the saintliness of a candidate for sainthood.109  The position of the devil’s 
advocate was instituted because the one-sided presentation of information led to erroneous 
decisions.  Apparently the position works well:  “Statistical data on [canonizations] clearly show 
that several processes, apparently very promising at the beginning, had to be abandoned later 
because of difficulties, raised by the promoter of the faith [the official title of the devil’s 
advocate], which could not be satisfactorily answered.  In these cases, the critical and seemingly 
negative work of the promoter of the faith undoubtedly has a great positive value....”110  Here, the 
adversary system is almost wholly artificial, but corrects the pressure towards a too-hasty 
judgment under factual circumstances in which everyone is really on the same side.
Contemporary enforcement agencies have also been concerned to create breathing space 
for lawyers, and so limit their duties to disclose.  In In re Carter & Johnson, the SEC declined to 
impose a duty on lawyers to take extraordinary action to combat fraud, because such a duty 
would mean that "the more sophisticated members of management would soon realize that there 
is nothing to gain in consulting outside lawyers."111
The SEC's conclusion on this point supports the analysis suggested here in two respects.  
First, the SEC's desire for "outside lawyers" demonstrates the SEC's belief that many lawyers are 
too closely associated with clients to disclose information, even when the lawyers may be civilly 
109 M.M. Barry, Devil’s Advocate, in 4 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 829-830 (1967).   See 
also Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary  System as a Means of Seeking 
Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147, 147-148 (2002).
110 Id. at 830.  
111 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84, 171 (SEC 1981). See 
also id. at 84,167 ("Lawyers who are seen by their clients as being motivated by fears for their 
personal liability will not be consulted on difficult issues.").
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 36
liable under rule 10b-5 for all damages resulting from the failure to disclose.  That supports the 
conclusion suggested here that many lawyers will not disclose information that harms their 
clients.  
Second, the SEC did not require lawyers to resign when their clients ignored the lawyers' 
advice to disclose, because lawyers restrain the unethical and illegal impulses of clients.  As the 
SEC observed, "Premature resignation serves neither the end of an effective lawyer-client 
relationship nor, in most cases, the effective administration of the securities laws."112  This 
suggests the social benefits that can result from the continuation of a lawyer-client relationship in 
which the parties have confidence in one another.
This approach to the problem of lawyer regulation does not result from the SEC's 
unreasoning favoritism for lawyers.  In fact, where the SEC has created greater enforcement 
duties for private accountants, it has coupled those enforcement duties with mechanisms to keep 
clients from firing those parties.  The SEC does this by requiring the client company to disclose 
both that it has changed accountants and the reasons for the change.113  This negates the 
112 Id. at 84, 172.
113 See generally Securities Act Release No. 6594, Request for Comments on "Opinion 
Shopping," [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,804 (July 1, 1985) 
(Concept Release); Disclosure Amendments to Regulation S-K and Forms 8-K and N-SAR 
Regarding Changes in Accountants and Opinion Shopping, Securities Act Release No. 6719, 
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 84, 139 (June 18, 1987) (proposed rules to 
amend disclosure requirements); Disclosure Amendments to Regulation S-K, Form 8-K, and 
Schedule 14A Regarding Changes in Accountants and Potential Opinion Shopping Situations, 
Securities Act Release No. 6766, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 72,421 (April 7, 1988) (final 
rules). See also Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 
1996) (public policy prohibits firing an accountant for her refusal to falsify information); 
McCurdy v. Kansas Dep’t of Transp., 898 P.2d 650 (Kan. App. 1995) (lawyer could not be fired 
for refusing to take an assignment in which she had a conflict of interest); Kenneth J. Wilber, 
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"advantage" to the company from switching to an accountant with a permissive attitude to 
disclosure.  Even under these circumstances, the widespread fraud and document destruction 
committed and abetted by accounting firms demonstrates how unrealistic it is to hope that the 
incentives to conceal harmful secret information can be easily overcome.114
Moreover, the SEC’s decision to require disclosure here recognizes the mechanisms for 
correction that exist in the securities law context.  When a security is issued, the future of the 
company is open to public view and can be compared with statements made at the time the 
security was sold.  When a lawsuit is settled, or even adjudicated, the underlying circumstances 
almost invariably remain concealed.  This increases the incentive to withhold information.115
Existing attempts to incorporate the interventionist judge into the American system have 
created difficulties.116  Even Judge Frankel, who favors broad lawyers’ duties to promote the 
truth, believes that making “the trial judge as a participant is likely to impair the adversary 
process as frequently as he improves it.”117  That the SEC, the very body on which Frankel relies 
for his idea about duties to disclose,118 would reject a duty to disclose in this context reveals the 
problematic nature of mandatory disclosure.  Nor do judges in our system themselves seem 
Wrongful Discharge of Attorneys:  A Cause of Action to Further Professional Responsibility, 92 
DICK. L. REV. 777 (1988).
114
 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1520 add provisions penalizing destruction of audit records.  
115 See White, supra note 95, at 930.
116 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
117 Frankel, supra note 23, at 1045.
118 See Frankel, supra note 23, at 1057-58 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974)).
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 38
critical of the effects of advocacy on justice; instead of criticizing the adversary system, they 
generally call for better advocacy.119  Thus, the existence of inquisitorial systems in other 
countries provides little support for adopting such a system in the United States, and existing 
research and the experience of the SEC provide a strong basis for rejecting any claim that lawyers 
should assume substantial inquisitorial duties in the context of an adversary system.  
3. Procedural Justice and the Truth-Finding Ideal 
 The analysis thus far has shown that a duty to promote truth will not have the effect of 
promoting truth.  The defects of a duty to promote truth become even more clear when we 
consider that the production of truth before the court is not the sole goal of the legal system.
First, there are important procedural values to be served by the legal system.  One is 
honesty to participants.  Honesty to the court conflicts with honesty to the client.  The best way to 
promote truth in court is for the lawyer to lie out of court, by falsely telling the client that 
information from the client is confidential, so that the client will provide the lawyer information 
harmful to the client, which the lawyer can then present to the court.  
Put in such a stark form, I expect that most will find lying to the client unacceptable even 
for the promotion of the truth at trial.120  But the conflict exists even when it is not present in a 
119 David C. Sarnacki, Effective Trial Advocacy in Federal Court; 74 Mich. B.J. 644 (1995); 
Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Legal Education: Observations and Perceptions from the Bench, 30 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 369 (1995); Warren E. Burger, Foreword: Conference on Supreme Court 
Advocacy, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 525 (1984); Lawrence W. Pierce, Essay, Appellate Advocacy:  
Some Reflections from the Bench, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 829 (1993); Irving R. Kaufman, 
Appellate Advocacy in the Federal Courts, 79 F.R.D. 165, 166 (1978); E. Barrett Prettyman, 
Some Observations Concerning Appellate Advocacy, 39 VA. L. REV. 285, 294 (1953); Abner J. 
Mikva, Counsel Lack Selectivity in Appellate Advocacy, Legal Times, Nov. 15, 1982, at 10.
120 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 110.  But see LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 
174.  Monroe Freedman finds it permissible for lawyers not to tell clients that the lawyers will 
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stark form.  Is it immoral not to warn the client, on the grounds that a failure to warn is an 
implicit deception?121  One need not have any very extended ideal of loyalty to question whether 
such a requirement is consistent with everyday morality.122  That police must warn arrested 
suspects123 certainly suggests that a lawyer should inform the client that anything the client says 
can and will be used against her.  Such warnings, while truthful, will substantially reduce the 
truth-finding power of the attorney's role.124  This reduction makes a duty of truth-promotion less 
attractive.
disclose a client’s intent to kill another or a client’s concealment of his guilt in a crime for which 
another is about to be executed, in part because of the overriding value of human life (not the
truth-finding ideal) and in part because such a situation is so rare that disclosure is unnecessary. 
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 120-23.
121 Goldman apparently takes this view, because he would allow, perhaps require the lawyer 
to “inform[] the client in advance that knowledge of guilt may cause him to refrain from such 
using certain tactics to secure acquittal that he might have otherwise used.”  GOLDMAN, supra
note 3, at 136.  Freedman also recognizes this as a way of preventing the argument that the 
lawyer’s informing of the client betrays the client’s expectations, albeit at the cost of 
discouraging lawyer-client communications.  FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 37-38.  Freedman would not inform clients of his willingness to 
disclose their secrets in the case of the threatened imposition of the death penalty on an innocent 
person or in the case of clients’ conduct that threatens death or serious injury to another.  See 
supra n. 115.
122 Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend:  The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
123 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).  See also United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264 (1980) (deciding that the use of informant who had established a relation of trust with 
the defendant violated the sixth amendment rights of the defendant).
124 Although Goldman acknowledges the similarity to Miranda, he ignores the long-term 
harm to the truth-finding power the attorney’s role that such a warning will cause.  See 
GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 110.
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Second, a procedural system should be seen as fair by those compelled to participate in it.
The participants in a legal system prefer an adversary system even over a pure inquisitorial 
system, and this is especially true of those who lose.125  Subjects “were more satisfied overall 
with the adversary procedure ..., thought they were treated more humanely and with greater 
dignity under this procedure ..., believed this procedure to be more fair to themselves ..., and 
thought both sides had more opportunity to present evidence under this procedure.”126  Subjects 
also “trusted the adversary lawyer significantly more ..., believed the adversary attorney made a 
better presentation of their case ..., and would trust the adversary procedure more than the 
inquisitorial procedure if they were to be involved again in a similar situation.”127
Finally, “subjects were significantly more satisfied with a verdict received in an adversary 
court ... and trusted the judge more when he presided over an adversary trial.”128  Thus, “the 
adversary system produces greater satisfaction than does the inquisitorial procedure on the most 
125 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 43, at 73-74.  I have omitted the prob-values from the 
text here and in the next two notes; all results were statistically significant.  Observers shared all 
these beliefs about the adversary system.  Id. at 74-76.  Although the original study was limited 
to males, id. at 69, the reported preferences from this study are exactly the same as those from 
studies not limited to males that were collected in the United States, Great Britain, France, and 
Germany.  Id. at 78.
126 Id. at 74.
127 Id. at 74.  Observers shared all these beliefs about the adversary system.  Id. at 74-76.  
The greater trust in the attorney in the adversary system provides some empirical support for the 
idea that an adversary attorney will gain more knowledge about a client’s plans, and therefore the 
opportunity to forestall illegal or immoral ones.
128 Id. at 74.
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important dimensions.  In fact, in most cases, this superiority is shown to be true regardless of the 
verdict or the subjects’ belief about guilt.”129
Summing up their research, Thibaut and Walker concluded:
It may be that participant subjects contemplating the adjudication 
at hand and observer subjects contemplating possible involvement 
in a similar future adjudication prefer to trust their fates to a 
systemic process that balances the biases of two attorneys 
(adversary representation) rather than to an essentially individual 
process that attempts to rule out bias altogether (as in the case with 
inquisitorial representation).  The argument here is that subjects are 
more willing to trust an adversary system than an inquisitorial 
attorney to produce accurate, unbiased judgments.130
Other researchers report similar results.  Litigants perceive the procedures used as an 
important ingredient of justice, and fair procedures increase the likelihood of voluntary 
compliance.131  The United States' adversary system produces more litigant satisfaction than 
inquisitorial or mixed systems, especially for those who have lost in court.132  Such satisfaction 
129 Id. at 74.
130 Id. at 77.
131 E.g., E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eyes of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their 
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 J. L. & SOC'Y 953, 985 (1990); THIBAUT & WALKER, 
supra note 43, at 118 (the adversary system was "judged fairest and most trust-worthy both by 
persons subject to litigation and by those observing the proceedings"). Subjects whose own legal 
system is inquisitorial nonetheless prefer adversarial resolution. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 
43, at 77-80.
132 Joseph E. Schumacher et al., Procedural Justice Judgments of Alternative Procedures for 
Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, Paper Presented at American Psychological Association 
Annual Meeting 2-3 (1991) ("First, subjects express a clear preference for adversarial procedures 
over inquisitorial ones. Second, this preference is strongly influenced by subjective judgments of 
fairness; the adversarial process is perceived as more fair than the inquisitorial one.").
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produces a greater degree of observance of judicial decisions.133  The alienation from one's 
attorney under a proposed rule of truth-seeking may interfere with the acceptance of the legal 
system’s judgments.134  The ability of the legal system to obtain voluntary adherence to its 
decisions has been recognized as an important goal in a variety of contexts—some have even 
seen it as a more important goal than accuracy in results.135
This preference for the adversary system did not result from the familiarity of citizens of 
the United States with the adversary system and the consequent expectation that it should be 
used.  The preferences for the adversary system reported from this study was also reported in 
other studies conducted in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany.136
These preferences exist even in a case of simple facts and no dishonesty on the part of 
attorneys.  This likely understates the preferences for an adversary system that would exist in real 
life.  In real life, the heavy involvement of the judiciary is more likely to misdirect the focus of 
133 Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of 
Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 629, 645 (1989); Tom R. 
Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of 
Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 621, 626 
(1991).
134 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 43, at 66; C HARLES CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 21 (1954).
135 Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1092 (1991) ("Trials serve 
purposes beyond the accurate determination of facts.  It is probably more important that the 
results of litigation be accepted than that they be accurate.  Accuracy is merely a factor, albeit a 
rather important factor, in acceptability.").  See also Charles Nesson, The Evidence of the Event?  
On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1985); 
Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus, 66 B.U.L. REV. 521 (1986); Lawrence Tribe, 
Trial by Mathematics:  Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 
(1971).
136 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 43, at 78.
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the suit,137 and the activity of one’s own adversary attorney provides far greater protection 
against dishonesty or bias by the judiciary or opposing counsel.
4. Conclusion 
 Much of the attraction of a duty to promote the truth comes from a failure to appreciate 
how such a duty will work in practice.  The proponents of such a duty apply it to a situation in 
which a lawyer knows the truth but presents information inconsistent with the truth.
That image is misleading in two respects.  First, if lawyers are under a duty to promote 
truth, clients will take steps to insure that lawyers never learn an inconvenient truth.  Clients may 
be abetted in this by lawyers, as Judge Frankel acknowledges.138
Second, lawyers and clients will not comply with a rule requiring disclosure.  Judge 
Frankel suggested this in discussing tampering with the evidence,139 but did not discuss the 
resulting skewing of evidence presented to the finder of fact in a case where disclosing and non-
disclosing lawyers oppose one another.  That skewing will favor dishonest clients and their 
137 See infra p. 37 & note 117.
138 Although there are cases in which the lawyer realizes that the "client's position rests upon 
falsehood," "[m]uch more numerous are the cases in which we manage as counsel to avoid too 
much knowledge. ....  Unfettered by the clear prohibitions actual 'knowledge' of the truth might 
impose, lawyers may be effective and exuberant in employing the familiar skills...."  Frankel, 
supra note 23, at 1039. See also FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra
note 1, at  51-58.
139 Frankel, supra note 23, at 1056 (discovery by itself will not solve all problems, because 
of "the well-founded fears of tampering with the evidence").
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attorneys.  Moreover, the clients hiring non-disclosing lawyers are likely to be among the most 
powerful groups in society.140
Finally, the harm caused by such a rule would not be limited to the difficulties caused by 
differential compliance with that rule.  The fear of some lawyers’ not complying will encourage 
other lawyers who would otherwise follow the rules not to comply for fear of harming their own 
clients’ legitimate interests.141  As White observes, "[T]he violation of the higher standard would 
cast all the rules in doubt."142  He then asks, "What level of violation of the rules can the bar 
accept without the rules as a whole becoming a mockery?"143  The answer is uncertain, but an 
unenforceable and frequently ignored ethical obligation may create such general contempt for the 
rules and an ethical decline in other areas.
The justification presented here for refusing to disclose information that would assist the 
other side does not rest on the distinctive status of lawyers.  Rather, it rests on a general principle 
that those who can reasonably expect that another will withhold information in violation of a 
moral duty are themselves justified in acting so as to minimize the advantage resulting from that 
anticipated withholding. These considerations apply quite generally.  Indeed, perhaps in 
140 Cf. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 119 (“the burden of such moral 
discretionary power is likely to fall most heavily upon the poor, the nonconformists, the 
dissidents, the déclassé, for they are most likely to have ends that outrage the moral sensibilities 
of the bureaucrats and functionaries with whom they must deal”).
141 Cf. THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 90-91 (1960) (discussing how 
expectations for segregated housing can promote segregated housing, despite the wishes of all 
residents in an area).
142 James J. White, supra note 95, at 938.
143 Id.
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recognition of the difficulties a contrary rule of disclosure would raise, the general rule in other 
areas of law allows concealment of information.144
The issue is akin to that of tolerating the intolerant:  we do not owe a duty to adhere to 
standards that others do not adhere to when we sincerely and reasonably believe adherence to 
those standards would cause us harm.145  Although the absence of a general duty of lawyers to 
provide evidence for the other side is sometimes cited as an example of lawyers’ role-
differentiated morality,146 for this reason it does not represent role differentiation at all.147
144 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979).  “A party may, therefore, 
reasonably expect the other to take normal steps to inform himself and to draw his own 
conclusions.  If the other is indolent, inexperienced, or ignorant, or if his judgment is bad or he 
lacks access to adequate information, his adversary is not generally expected to compensate for 
these deficiencies.  A buyer of property, for example is not ordinarily expected to disclose 
circumstances that make the property more valuable than the seller supposes.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d (1979).
To the extent that an assertion is one of opinion only, the recipient 
is not justified in relying on it unless the recipient...
(b) reasonably believes that, as compared with himself, the 
person whose opinion is asserted has special skill, judgment or 
objectivity with respect to the subject matter....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 169 (1979).  We do not, for example, expect parties to 
a negotiation for a house to say that they would be willing to take a good deal less or pay a good 
deal more.  Such a duty would be difficult to enforce.  However, we may expect them to disclose 
relevant, objective information about the house, because of the ease of verifying that information 
after the sale.  Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960).  This is why Frankel errs in 
assuming that disclosure obligations that are effective under the securities laws must necessarily 
be effective elsewhere.  Frankel, supra note 23, at 1058.  Securities laws are effective because the 
buyer can compare the description with the reality after the fact; the same is not true in litigation.
145 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 218 (1971).  See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 2-3 (1993) (one is bound to the fair terms of social cooperation only if others assent 
to them, too).
146 See Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 155.
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Finally, as suggested in the last section of the preceding material, the adversary system’s 
diligent pursuant of truth can harm other values of the system—honesty to clients, satisfaction 
with the system, and the voluntary adherence to the judgments of the system.  These harms 
provide a further reason for rejecting a duty to produce truth in the place of the current adversary 
system.
C. Promoting Justice As an Alternative to the Adversary 
System 
 The difficulties in adopting increased disclosures for lawyers may suggest that the 
problem is not how lawyers use the system in working for their clients, but the goal of the 
adversary system itself.  This leads some observers to emphasize a different reformation of the 
system.148  These critics suggest that the problem cannot be solved by comparatively narrow 
restraints on deceptive conduct. Rather, they suggest that the lawyer should compare her 
activities with the ideal of promoting justice, rather than the ideal of promoting truth.  In this 
view, the deontological restraints relating to truth-telling are replaced by a teleological 
orientation for justice.149
In support of this claim, adherents to theories of justice promotion could argue that justice 
is a more primary goal than truth.  Moreover, a justice-based theory of the lawyer’s desirable 
activities can, if applied to only the lawyer’s decision to take a case, avoid the skewing of results 
147 Cf. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 155 (“If a lawyer is permitted to puff, 
bluff, or threaten on occasion, this is not because of the adversary system and the principle of 
nonaccountability, but because, in such circumstances, anyone would be permitted to do the 
same.”).
148 E.g., LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2; GOLDMAN, supra note 3.
149 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 16-18 (1985).
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caused in practice by a rule of truth promotion.150  As a result, it does not tamper with the ability 
of the adversary system to promote truth.
The details of the justice-promoting approach vary slightly.  David Luban claims that 
lawyers should assist clients only with just claims.  For example, the statute of limitations, meant 
to prevent the assertion of false or fraudulent claims, should not be asserted to bar valid 
claims.151
Alan Goldman advocates a view that “would call upon lawyers to exercise independent 
judgment in refusing to violate moral rights of others even in the pursuit of that to which clients 
might be legally entitled.  It also might call upon them to exceed legal bounds in order to realize 
moral rights of their clients.”152
William H. Simon, another advocate of a justice-based approach, argues, “The lawyer 
should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem 
most likely to promote justice.”153
The attractiveness of these approaches depends on contrasting an unjust or indeterminate 
legal system with a just, shared, and determinate moral code.154  Goldman, Luban, and Simon 
150 Cf. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra n. 23 at 66-70 (1990) (arguing 
that lawyers are morally accountable for their choice of clients, but duty bound to use all legally 
available means to advance the ends of clients chosen).
151 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 146.  
152 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 138.
153 Simon, supra note 6, at 1090.
154 Simon argues only that a moral code can be determinate, for the same reasons that a legal 
code can be.  Simon, supra note 6, at 1121-22.  However, this does not demonstrate that the 
moral code is likely to be more predictable than the legal code.  Sometimes, a person’s moral 
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share an assumption that morality is determinate, albeit difficult to express in general rules.  
Thus, Luban talks about the “lawyer ... about to embark on a course of action that is unjustified 
from the point of view of ordinary morality”155 and refers to “the common morality that figures 
into our deliberations.”156  Likewise, Goldman refers to “our common moral framework.”157
Simon criticizes those who are “skeptical that judgments applying abstract ideals to particular 
cases could be anything but arbitrary.”158
The statements of Goldman, Luban, and Simon invoke common morality, and thereby 
assume away the problems of disagreements and gray areas.  General statements about 
parallelism in our moral principles do not resolve the issue of whether lawyers should frustrate 
their clients’ lawful goals.  Arguing that lawyers should follow moral principals as opposed to 
law must depend on the assertion that citizens’ moral principals are better, because more widely 
shared and determinate, than the legal system.  This is ultimately an empirical question about 
what people believe and how those beliefs compare to the legal system.  In a system that is 
code will produce a certain answer where the legal code does not; sometimes the reverse will no 
doubt be true.  But even when moral codes are determinate, they may not be shared.  Only a 
shared morality produces a truly attractive alternative to legalistic determination, and it seems 
unlikely that a shared morality will, in a democratic society, be widely at variance with the legal 
system.
155 See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse [hereinafter Luban, The Adversary 
System Excuse], in DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 101 (1984) [hereinafter LUBAN, THE 
GOOD LAWYER].  
156 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 146.
157 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 149.  These references are reinforced by frequent use of the 
idea of “moral rights.”  E.g., id. at 126-30. 
158 Simon, supra note 6, at 1090.
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largely democratic, it is unlikely that there remains untapped a large area of moral agreement that 
can be used to supplement or replace adherence to law.  Existing law prohibits the lawyers’ 
assisting in the goal through the presentation of false evidence.159  Under those circumstances, 
the shared morality of the law favors the goal, the clients wants it, the lawyer is restricted from 
using many immoral means to achieve it, and the question is whether the lawyer should interpose 
herself between the client and a lawful goal.  
One should not infer from the client’s wanting something that the lawyer thinks is 
unethical that the client is wrong and the lawyer is right.  Differences in ethical rules are 
ubiquitous in a democratic society.  As John Rawls observes, “The political culture of a 
democratic society is always marked by a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines.  Some of these are perfectly reasonable . . . .”160  Accepting 
159 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(4) (1980) (requiring that the 
lawyer not "knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence"); MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(5) (prohibiting the lawyer from knowingly making a false 
statement of law or fact); MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.2(d) (1983) 
(prohibiting the lawyer from assisting in illegal or fraudulent conduct); MODEL RULE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3.3 (1983) (prohibiting the lawyer from making a false statement 
of material fact or law or offering evidence known to be false); MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY  4.1 (1983) (prohibiting the lawyer from making a false statement of fact or law 
even in non-adversarial settings); MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3.3(a)(4) 
(1983) (duty to correct presentation of false evidence); ABA Comm. On Professional Ethics and 
Grievances, Formal Opinion 87-353 (1987) (same).
160 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1-2 (1993) [hereinafter, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].  
Contrast this with Goldman’s view that “even such substantial and fundamental differences in 
value orientations  [as the disagreement between libertarians and egalitarians over the moral 
status of redistributive taxation] can be resolved, if there is willingness to reason from the 
background of shared commitments and judgments.”  GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 17. 
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this continuing diversity is not the acceptance of dogmatic relativism,161 the view that all moral 
perceptions are of equal worth, but merely a recognition that we cannot make some citizens’ 
moral views supreme, especially if those views have not been enacted into law.  
Because we cannot proceed as if there were a universal moral “brooding omnipresence in 
the sky,”162 we must recognize that applying moral limits on lawyers’ conduct necessarily means 
applying, not some general common morality, but the moral limits of particular people.163  As a 
result, overriding the moral decision implicit in the law will not substitute morality for law, but 
will replace the collective moral judgment implicit in the law with the moral views of lawyer and 
client.  Likewise, overriding a client’s decision does not replace a client’s judgment with a 
“moral decision,” but replaces the client’s moral judgment with the lawyer’s moral judgment.
Luban and Goldman do not shrink from this characterization of their work, but they fail 
to recognize its implications.164  First, where the lawyer and the client share a moral view that is 
161 Goldman argues that tolerance cannot be a supreme value.  GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 
14.  I agree, but showing that tolerance cannot be a supreme value is quite different from 
showing that someone is immoral if she cooperates in advancing the moral goals of someone 
with whom she disagrees.
162 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
163 The argument here parallels that of Rawls in Political Liberalism.  Rawls does not 
dogmatically assert that there are not universal values, but only that we must reject such 
“comprehensive views” in the political sphere.  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 160, 
at 150.  Similarly, I can concede that there may be a universal comprehensive morality, but argue 
that the inevitable diversity of views makes it essential that we proceed on the basis of tolerance 
for other views by not presupposing any comprehensive views.
164 See GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 142 (the issue is “whether the moral judgments of 
individual lawyers in specific cases are likely to be more congruent with the proper specification 
of moral rights than are legal rights”); LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 174 
(discussing betrayal of client).
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at odds with the law, making moral grounds the basis for overriding political judgments will 
empower lawyers to put into practice their own moral views, regardless of the law.  Second, 
where the client and the lawyer are at odds with each other, ignoring the client’s wishes allows 
the lawyer to win a moral conflict that cannot reasonably be described as a conflict between 
morality and the client’s wishes, or even between social morality and the client’s morality, but 
rather of one between the client’s morality and the lawyer’s morality.  Neither result is desirable.
1. Immoral Means to Illegal Ends 
 According to Luban, the law departs from morality in allowing unjust actions, because 
the law cannot prohibit these injustices without intruding too much into people’s lives.165
Similarly, Goldman says that “moral rights form too fine a grid to be captured by general rules,” 
and law is too “blunt a social instrument” to be “a substitute for good moral sense of citizens, 
lawyers included.”166  Consequently, their desired approach is not to amend the law, which is 
necessarily incomplete, but to require lawyers to consider moral factors in their legal work.167
165 David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative:  A Response to Professor Pepper, 1986 
AMERICAN BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 637, 640.
166 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 140.
167 Goldman argues for a strong role differentiation for judges.  GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 
49.  This suggests that Goldman is not strongly committed to the idea of achieving justice in a 
particular case.  If the concern here were for general morality, it might have been argued that his 
justice-based concerns could have been addressed by judges’ power to modify the provisions of 
the law because of the circumstances of the particular case.  The common-law method, with its 
case-specific approach, might be thought to be especially suited, but even in the civil law 
countries, there is a strong tradition to this effect, stemming from the writings of Aquinas.  See
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICAE, Q.  96, art. 6, reprinted in AQUINAS, SELECTED 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 141 (A.P. D’Entreves ed. & J.G. Dawson trans., 1974); ARTHUR TAYLOR 
VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 54 (2d ed. 1977) (quoting 
and translating Jean Portalis, et al., Discours Preliminaire, in 1 F RANCE, LA LEGISLATION CIVILE, 
COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE 251, 255 (1827) (“The function of the law (loi) is 
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Recognizing justice as a priority means that justice sometimes takes priority over truth.  
Thus, Goldman expressly places a strong priority on moral claims:  a moral but illegal end 
sometimes justifies means that are both immoral and illegal.  He would have the lawyer submit 
false income reports required in a divorce case, where correct income reports would show that a 
welfare recipient had committed criminal fraud by not reporting $60 a week of income from 
baby-sitting.168  Goldman would also allow a lawyer to fabricate evidence necessary for a divorce 
in a state where both parties want a divorce and the state prohibits divorce without evidence of 
adultery.169
Although Luban does not make himself clear on this point, he does suggest that 
“frustrating the search for truth may be a morally worthy thing to do, and sometimes moral rights 
are ill-served by legal rights.”170  Because Luban generally seems to believe that obstructing the 
truth is ordinarily immoral in itself,171 he, too, apparently believes that moral but illegal ends may 
justify immoral and perhaps illegal means.
In part this sentiment may result from Goldman’s and Luban’s sympathies for the 
oppressed.  Both Goldman and Luban are concerned about the problem of the rich corporation 
to fix, in broad outline, the general maxims of justice (droit), to establish principles rich in 
suggestiveness (conséquences) and not to descend into the details of the questions that can arise 
in each subject.”).
168 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 139-40.
169 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 139 ("only a fanatic on the subject of obedience to law would 
find either the lawyer's or the couple's action objectionable if they pursued their moral right").  
170 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 155.
171 See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 69 (criticizing lawyers for excluding 
probative evidence).
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 53
arrayed against the poor or middle-class individual.172  Luban, at least, will allow more 
adversarial conduct on behalf of the poor or middle class:  “lawyers representing individuals in 
confrontations with powerful organizations can fight dirtier than their adversaries’ lawyers can 
fight back.”173  Simon seemingly agrees.174
However, morality is as incomplete as Luban and Goldman claim that the law is.175  In a 
world of varying perceptions of morality, many of which are reasonable, the law provides a 
specification of things initially morally ambiguous.176  As Goldman says, “[T]here would be at 
least as much disagreement [over questions of moral right] as over questions of legal right.”177
Very few would claim, for example, that general theories of morality have anything to say about 
172 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 120-22; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 156-
57.
173 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 156-57.
174 See Simon, supra note 6, at 1093-94. 
175 Simon argues only that the incompleteness of the law and morality are similar.  Simon, 
supra note 6, at 1090-91. 
176 E.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, Chapter 7 (Bekker 1134b18) 
(distinguishing between the universal principle that all prisoners can be ransomed and the 
positive law provision determining a matter initially indifferent, setting the ransom at one mina); 
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Q 91, Art. 3 (a human law is necessary because "the 
human reason needs to proceed to a more particular determination of certain matters"); Lloyd 
Weinreb, Law As Order, 91 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1978).  Cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 153 
(“where [the law and morality] do not clearly conflict, the law ought to prevail in settlement of 
the dispute”).
177 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 145.  However, this means that Goldman’s proposed rules 
will not act effectively to restrain actions by the rich and powerful, who always have better 
access to lawyers.
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whether my lender’s security interest in the computer on which I write this would qualify as a 
security interest in household goods or is instead only a security interest in equipment.178
A moralistic perspective, in which morality replaces law, ultimately allows each lawyer to 
decide for herself who qualifies as poor and oppressed.  Goldman accepts lying to the court to 
help a mother on welfare provide for her children.179  Given this precedent, the tobacco 
companies (for example) will have little difficulty finding libertarian lawyers who believe that 
the mother’s moral claim is much weaker than the moral claim to the right of free trade between 
willing buyers and sellers.  They will be happy to apply their moral views to use immoral means 
to avoid the oppression of tobacco companies by evil-doing governments and plaintiffs’ 
personal-injury lawyers, so that the tobacco companies’ moral claim amply justifies presenting 
perjured testimony.
Although the libertarian lawyers may be rare, in a free market it will be to the advantage 
of tobacco companies and libertarian lawyers to seek one another out, and they will have little 
difficulty in doing so.  Even in the more usual case, attorneys do not restrain their corporate 
clients.  A survey of attorneys in large Chicago firms revealed that three-fourths of them never 
experienced “a conflict between their personal values and the request of a client.”180  Half of 
178 Compare U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (1994) (consumer goods) with U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (1994) 
(equipment).  See also U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 2 (1994) (discussing borderline cases). The 
difference is that no filing would be required to perfect a purchase money security interest in 
consumer goods.  U.C.C. § 9-302(10(d) (1994).  See also U.C.C. § 9-102 comment 5 (1994) 
(cataloguing different rules for different types of property).
179 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 139-40.
180
   Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy:  Social Values and Client 
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 536 (1985).   
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these conflicts were generated by the ethical rules governing lawyers, not by private ethical 
concerns of the lawyers.181
Even if we ameliorate Goldman’s and Luban’s views by requiring claims to be consistent 
with prevailing law, the justice-based view allows enormous scope for the manipulation of 
evidence.  Suppose the defendant's lawyer decides, based on an assessment of the defendant's 
credibility, that the defendant did not see the contract critical to the defense of the case.  Under 
the proposed duty to promote the truth, would the defendant's lawyer be justified in withholding 
evidence that contradicted her ultimate conclusion that her client was telling the truth on the 
grounds that the evidence could only mislead the jury?182  Allowing lawyers to conceal evidence 
that they think contradicts the truth will allow even greater manipulation of the evidence than a 
truth-promoting standard.  Moreover, concealing the evidence rejects our system of justice’s 
reliance on a neutral third party to determine truth.
Goldman’s conclusion troubles many lawyers, who may be more sensitive to its 
implications.  Andrew Kaufman writes, “At the risk of confessing to being a ‘fanatic,’ I would 
argue that Professor Goldman’s solutions are not preferable. . . .  [E]xcept in extreme cases, I am 
dubious about placing moral responsibility on lawyers to make judgments concerning whether a 
181 Id. at 537.  Nelson concludes that there is a high degree of identification of corporate 
lawyers with their corporate clients.  Id. at 526-27.  Simon agrees.  “Casual observation suggests 
that the private goals of many lawyers run overwhelmingly toward acquiescence in the goals of 
clients.”  Simon, supra note 6, at 1127.
182 Frankel may avoid this requirement because his rule 10b-5 standard may require 
disclosure of information, but those who place a higher priority on justice than on truth will have 
more difficulty.
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particular divorce law is more immoral than the deceit they are being paid to practice.”183  That it 
troubles lawyers suggests that lawyers’ desire for freedom of action does not explain all the 
professional rules advancing the interests of the client; if it did, lawyers ought to agree with 
Goldman on this point.184
Luban’s and Goldman’s conception of duties may be attractive where a law is radically 
unjust.  But such a radically unjust law will be the unusual case in a democratic system.185  Rules 
should reflect the usual, not the bizarre case, and leave civil disobedience to the truly rare cases.  
Current rules limit lawyers’ ability to promote injustice by requiring them to adhere to law; 
Luban’s and Goldman’s proposal will allow lawyers to promote injustice by allowing them to 
follow their own version of morality, instead of the law.
183 ANDREW KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 780 (3d ed. 1989) 
(alluding to GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 139).  (A fourth edition of this book is written with a co-
author, see Andrew Kaufman & David Wilkins, Problems in Professional Responsibility for a 
Changing Profession (4th ed. 2002), but, except for citations to source material, I prefer to use the 
earlier book to avoid any possible implication that the views presented are those of the co-
author).  While I tend to agree with Kaufman on this point, the overwhelming anecdotal evidence 
is that lawyers do create false evidence in such a situation by coaching witnesses.  They do this in 
the full knowledge that the judges know that the evidence is false, but will grant the divorce 
because the judges disapprove of the law.  In one case within my personal knowledge, a person 
now a sitting federal judge watched her witness depart on the witness stand from the coached 
testimony, and the judge called counsel into chambers and reprimanded counsel for inadequately 
preparing the witnesses.  See also A.P. HERBERT, Not a Crime, in UNCOMMON LAW 425, 442 
(new ed. 1969).
184 Cf. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 58 (arguing that lawyers’ desire to 
justify ruthless behavior on behalf of clients explains their ethical position); GOLDMAN, supra
note 3, at 153 (economic motivation undercuts any presumption in favor of a moral proposition 
derived from a practice’s widespread acceptance within the legal profession).
185 KAUFMAN, supra note 183, at 780.
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2. Interference with Client Preferences 
 The other area of controversy is the morally desirable conduct when lawyer and client 
differ over the morality of a proposed course of action.  If we accepted the idea of a common 
morality from which the client is departing, the interposition of the lawyer’s morality between the 
client and the client’s immoral objects is at least superficially attractive.  Accepting the idea of 
differences in morality makes the question quite different.  In achieving a goal allowed by the 
legal system, what should happen when the moral views of the lawyer and the client differ?
Goldman and Luban have a two-step approach.  In the first step, they advocate dialogue 
between lawyer and client to resolve the conflict.186  Second, if this does not resolve the conflict, 
the lawyer should abandon the client,187 and, according to Luban, perhaps even engage in the 
“betrayal of a client’s projects.”188
Luban and Goldman intend the first step of the process, moral dialogue, as a way of 
ameliorating the risk of a lawyer’s refusal to work for a client.  However, dialogue creates an 
unrecognized risk of substituting the values of the lawyer for those of the client.  
186 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 174; G OLDMAN, supra note 3, at 126.
187 Goldman’s argument may be somewhat inconsistent on this point; in his discussion, he 
refers to the concept of “the moral rights of others” as a restraint on lawyer action, GOLDMAN, 
supra note 3, at 138; later this becomes “the clear moral rights of others,” id. at 149, which might 
allow for some deference.  Elsewhere, Goldman suggests that “[o]ne can in certain circumstances 
defer to the moral or factual judgment of others in seeking justice or truth,” but it is unclear that 
he would allow the lawyer to defer to the client.  Id. at 116.  
188 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 174.
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Lawyers’ ascendancy over clients makes it difficult or impossible to achieve the ideal of 
an equal give-and-take in the moral debate.189  Lawyers, like members of all professions, have 
social prestige, tend to deal with their clients in impersonal ways, have a special language that 
aggrandizes the professional’s knowledge, and provide services that the client may desperately 
need.190  These facts make it easy for any professional to treat clients paternalistically.  This 
effect of professional superiority on moral dialogue will be especially pronounced for lawyers, 
who are usually far more experienced in presenting views persuasively than are their clients.  
Moreover, as part of the effort to achieve legal results for clients, even lawyers with the 
best of intentions will filter clients’ statements according to legal ideas of relevance.191 By 
encouraging the definition of claims in terms of existing law, this process undercuts the 
possibility of legal change.192  Moreover, it filters out values inconsistent with lawyers’ values, 
because the lawyer will be reluctant to risk her reputation advancing claims that her professional 
colleagues view as inappropriate, even when this is advantageous for her clients.193  Thus, in 
189 See Smith, supra note 235, at 77-78.
190 See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals:  Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN 
RIGHTS 1, 21-22 (1975).
191 Lon Fuller, The Adversary System in TALKS ON AMERICAN Law 39-40 (Harold Berman 2d 
ed. 1971).  See also Lon Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility:  Report of the 
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
192 This flexibility in the law is one advantage that the common law system may have over 
the civil law system, which is related to the common law use of adversary proceedings.  See infra
pp. 18.
193 Wasserstrom, supra note 190, at 17.  See also Smith, supra note 235, at 76.
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exercising their best professional judgment, lawyers may suppress their clients’ goals without 
either lawyer or client really knowing it.194
Luban and Goldman argue that action by lawyers to enforce their ethical beliefs against 
society is not problematic because there is no collective decision-making by lawyers.195  Luban 
even compares the supposed oligarchy of lawyers to an oligarchy of spouses.196
Luban’s analogy and the similar arguments of Goldman do not fully address the problem.  
Lawyers as a class, unlike spouses, have interests and beliefs that are not representative of the 
larger society.  Thus, even in the absence of collective decision-making, lawyers acting on those 
beliefs will restrict potential clients’ action in a way that the larger society would recognize as 
unjust.  
Lawyers in practice for any length of time will have seen this phenomenon with respect to 
clients’ ability to obtain a lawyer to bring any sort of malpractice claims, and especially claims of 
legal malpractice against other lawyers.197  Goldman argues that attorneys “can distinguish 
194 See generally Lucie White, The Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 39 (1980).  
195 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 167-68 (comparing the threatened 
oligarchy of lawyers to an oligarchy of spouses); GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 145.  Elsewhere, 
Goldman thoughtfully considers the problem that exists where only one lawyer has the ability to 
deal with the case.  GOLDMAN, supra note 3 at 128-30.
196 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 167-68.
197 See Plaintiffs Win Right to Sue Lawyers in Malpractice Case, NEW YORK TIMES,
September 11, 1997, at A28 (national edition) (plaintiffs could not find any lawyers in Houston 
and had to find a lawyer from Kansas to represent them in their suit against a prominent Texas 
law firm).  One difficulty in proving that this exists is that the silent suppression of claims is 
difficult to document.  Only the most credulous, though, will believe that the rise of cases based 
on racial and sexual discrimination in the 1960s and 1970s was based on more discrimination, 
rather than the greater willingness of lawyers to bring cases.  Thus, one can infer the prior cases 
were suppressed.  No doubt the suppression occurred for a variety of reasons, not just lawyer 
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between representing unpopular, even morally objectionable clients, and aiding clients, whoever 
they are, to achieve specific objectives in violation of moral rights of others.”198  Unfortunately, 
the example of malpractice makes it difficult to be as optimistic as Goldman that Goldman’s 
attempt to confer discretion on lawyers will provide morally superior results.199
As with special duties of truth promotion, the costs of filtering are disproportionately 
visited on the poor and powerless.  First, the poor and powerless are less likely to succeed in 
presenting their moral vision to lawyers, because they have less influence over their lawyers.200
They do not have the money required to compel lawyers’ attention.  They are likely to come from 
different social backgrounds from lawyers, which means that lawyers will find it harder to 
understand such clients.  They are likely to be less educated and verbal than lawyers, making it 
harder for them to communicate persuasively their moral views.201  For these reasons, lawyers in 
obstruction, but lawyer obstruction could certainly be expected to have a role.  Other examples of 
instances in which lawyers may have presented major obstacles to the bringing of a case against 
respected individuals include sexual harassment and child molestation.
198 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 131.  
199
 These cases represent instances in which the American view that the attorney may act as 
a filter appears inferior to the stated British bus-stop or cab rank principle, in which a barrister 
must accept any case by anyone willing to pay her fee.  See Rondel v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 
665 (C.A. 1966), aff’d sub nom. Rondel v.  Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L. 1967).  
However, it is sometimes said that the rule is substantially undercut by the barrister’s clerk’s 
manipulation of the barrister’s financial demands.  JOHN FLOOD, BARRISTERS' CLERKS, THE 
LAW'S MIDDLEMEN 80 (1983).
200 Nelson, supra note 180, at 507; Mark Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy:  
Reflections on Corporate Lawyering and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 143-44 (1987).
201 Cf. White, supra note 194, at 55 (discussing the subordinating of speech habits of such 
witnesses in the formal legal process).
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poverty-law practice, despite their unquestioned dedication, fear that they themselves will be the 
oppressors and dominators of their clients.202  The effect of lawyers’ general interposition of their 
moral objections can certainly be expected to be even greater.  Finally, having been rejected by 
one lawyer, those on the margins of society will often lack the sophistication and access to legal 
services necessary to make it easy to obtain a second opinion from another lawyer.
When clients’ ability to achieve the legally correct goals are frustrated because lawyers 
interpose obstructions based on the lawyers’ own morality, the ability of the legal system to 
produce the legally correct result is frustrated just as much as it would be had a lawyer failed to 
offer evidence that undermined her client’s claim.  Advocates of lawyer activism do not address 
this problem, except by arguing that lawyer obstruction will occur only in cases of objectives that 
“blatantly violate moral rights.”203  The tragedy of the disregard of clients is especially great 
because the poor have far better access to judicial branch of government than they do to the 
legislature or the executive.204
202 See Paul Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level 
Bureaucracy, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 949 & nn. 6-7 (1992) (citing Anthony Alfieri, The 
Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 659, 661-665 (1987-88); Lucie White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering 
for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990)).
203 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 131.  See also id. at 111-12, 128-31 (discussing possibility 
that allowing lawyers to veto client action will transfer power to legislate to lawyers).  Goldman 
does advert to the possibility that a lawyer “represents the only legal service or expertise in a 
particular area,” and agrees that that “may then be a relevant consideration as to whether he 
should substitute his moral conscience for legal guidelines.”  Id. at 130.
204 Cf. David Barnhizer, The Virtue of Ordered Conflict: A Defense of the Adversary 
System, 79 NEB. L. REV. 657, 666-667 (2000) (The adversary system retains more of a sense of 
legitimacy and fairness than can be said for other branches of government that are seen as 
irretrievably captured by special interests. Many have therefore sought the force and legitimacy 
thought to be provided by legal rules and judicial decisions that favor their positions.”).
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A second problem resulting from lawyers’ interposition of their values is that the 
suppression of the client’s perspective harms the system’s respect for participatory values.205
Accuracy of result is not the sole goal of procedure.206  Even if a lawyer’s suppression of a 
client’s perspective is correct under existing law, that voice can be transformative, altering the 
results that the legal system would otherwise generate.207 Although many critics of the adversary 
system emphasize the lawyers’ limited duty to the public, the real problem in many lawyer-client 
relationships is the lawyers’ insufficient willingness to serve or listen to the client.208
Assuming the moral dialogue does not warp clients’ preferences, the lawyer and client 
may remain in disagreement.  At this point, Luban and Goldman say that the lawyer should leave 
the case.209  This conclusion is apparently based on the premise that advancing goals inconsistent 
205 See HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION, supra note 18, at 1-2; HABERMAS, 
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 18, at 264 (arguing that “the communicative and 
participatory rights that are constitutive for democratic opinion- and will- formation acquire a 
privileged position”).
206 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (allowing award of damages for a deprivation 
of due process even if the result was correct).  
207 See White, supra note 194, at 51; Understanding.
208 Wasserstrom, supra note 190, at 15-16.
209 Luban and Goldman do not consider the possibility that the lawyer can continue in the 
case while limiting his representation of the client.  Such a course is generally permissible.   
MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.2(c) (2003) (“A lawyer may limit the 
objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.”).  A fairly common 
form of such limitation is an exclusion of “objectives or means that the lawyer regards as 
repugnant or imprudent.”  Id. comment ¶ 4.  It is unclear why Luban and Goldman do not address 
this possibility 
Goldman and Luban also do not address the possibility of a limitation on representation 
imposed by the client on ethical grounds.  Such a limitation is implicit in the general principle 
that lawyers follow client instructions, and MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
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with one’s own morality is morally inconsistent.  Perhaps because of the emphasis of Goldman 
and Luban on our “common morality,”210 neither Goldman nor Luban considers the possibility of 
1.2(a) & cmt. ¶ 1(2003) requires consultation with the client about the means to be pursued and 
instructs lawyers to “defer to the client regarding … concern for third persons who might be 
adversely affected.”
The failure to treat these possibilities may result from an unstated assumption that clients 
have low ethical standards and that lawyers have (or ought to be treated as having) higher ethical 
standards, but that assumption is incorrect.  In many instances, the client will refuse to permit a 
lawyer’s action on the grounds that the action conflicts with the client’s own ethical norms, even 
though the action promotes the truth and the lawyer believes the action is morally permissible.  
For example, a client may instruct the lawyer not to pursue a line of cross-examination that 
would reveal the opposing party’s dishonest concealment of assets in a divorce, because the harm 
to the relationship between the parties would be too great.  
As a practicing lawyer, I saw no moral problem complying with such a request, even 
though it led to a financial result in the trial that was at odds with the truth-producing goal of the 
system, in that the court awarded the client less than the court would have awarded the client had 
the court known all the facts.  Even after considering the matter more, I believe the result is 
ethically permissible and perhaps praiseworthy.  (The client was wealthy enough so that a 
financial result bad in absolute terms would nonetheless leave him with ample resources, and the 
parties had minor children.)  
Goldman, who accepts perjury by opposing parties to achieve moral ends not allowed 
within the adversary system, would apparently believe this is permissible.  See GOLDMAN, supra
note 3, at 139 (although there is no legal right in the jurisdiction to a divorce by consent, so that 
"the principle of legal right would have the lawyer play no part in fabricating evidence or 
perpetrating a fraud upon the court," "only a fanatic on the subject of obedience to law would 
find either the lawyer's or the couple's action objectionable if they pursued their moral right"). 
Luban’s position is less clear.
If this result is acceptable to Goldman and Luban, they need to address the apparent 
inconsistency of this acceptability with their proposal for lawyer control in such situations.
210 See supra pp. 47-48 & nn. 155-157.  However, Goldman at least believes that one may 
not rationally be able to settle disagreements between moral choices.  GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 
13. Cf. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 174 (if the lawyer believes the client’s 
projects are immoral or unjust, the lawyer must cease representation or betray the client’s 
projects).
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moral tolerance:  that there is moral value to advancing the moral ends of other people even when 
we do not share them.  
Individuals practice a large degree of moral tolerance.  Many of us have close friendships 
with people who have different values, even if at times we are bewildered by their beliefs.211
This may come in part from some uncertainty about our own ethical views, the practical need for 
toleration in a diverse society, the recognition that most of us do differ in some respects in our 
ethical judgments, or from an affirmative belief that toleration for other moral views should be a 
part of one’s own moral code.  
Moreover, this tolerance can be more than the passive acquiescence in the conduct of 
people with a different moral code.  We may be inclined to assist their actions, even if they 
violate part of our own moral code.  My local bookstore sells books promoting views that it finds 
repugnant.  The ethical code of librarians even imposes a duty on them to make available books 
advocating positions that they find repugnant.212
To be sure, few of us would be willing to assist someone in murder, even if that person 
believes that murder is ethical.  However, such a hypothetical misrepresents the situation likely to 
confront lawyers, who are already prohibited from assisting in illegal or fraudulent conduct.213
211 See JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON LL.D. 814-15 (1791).
212
“Materials should not be excluded because of the origin, background, or views of those 
contributing to their creation.”  Library Bill of Rights, ¶ 1, reprinted in, e.g. , AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES, AALL DIRECTORY AND HANDBOOK 1995-96, at 364 (1995).  
“Materials should not be proscribed or removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval.”  
Id. ¶ 2.  All members of the American Library Association adhere to a code of ethics that 
includes the Library Bill of Rights.  AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES, supra, at 363.
213 See MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.2(d) (2004).
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We would be willing to assist in other ends that violate less central ethical beliefs.  So long as 
one accepts (unlike Goldman and perhaps unlike Luban) that one’s legal representation should be 
constrained by lawfulness, the scope for this sort of toleration in legal practice may be high.  
And, of course, this toleration is only permitted, not required.  If a lawyer believes her client is 
being morally insincere or has a strong disagreement, she can decline representation at the 
outset.214
The example of the library parallels that of the lawyer.  In both cases, it is more ethical 
that a social institution empower people without discrimination than that those who run the 
institution insure that it is used only to advance views consistent with those who run the 
institution.  Few if any librarians believe that this rule of ethics interferes with their views.215  If 
anything, the argument for moral tolerance in this situation for lawyers is stronger than the 
argument for moral tolerance by librarians, because lawyers have a state-created monopoly on 
providing legal assistance, whereas one can always purchase a book on one’s own.
Even if one rejects this account of moral tolerance, the Luban and Goldman prescription 
that the lawyer leave the case seems unjustified by any sort of ethical analysis.  If the lawyer 
leaves the case, then the client will either find equivalent legal talent elsewhere or she will not.  
If she does not find the same legal talent, the lawyer will have successfully substituted the 
lawyer’s values for the client’s.  Goldman suggests that this will be true only in the case of 
214 See MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.2(c) (2004).
215 A brief and highly informal survey turned up no librarians who believed that the enforced 
availability of views with which they disagreed under the Library Bill of Rights interfered with 
their own ethical views, and a good deal of surprise at the very question.
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 66
objectives that “blatantly violate moral rights.”216  However, this conclusion is unsupported.  For 
the reasons suggested above, lawyers can be suspected of having different preferences from the 
rest of society.  
Suppose, though, that there is no mutation or suppression of client voice, and there is no 
problem caused by the unavailability of another lawyer.  In that case, the client is free to go to 
another lawyer to pursue her goals.  Goldman accepts this result, because he acknowledges that a 
lawyer may warn a client, which means that Goldman’s approach will not prevent a client from 
achieving his goals.217  However, Luban suggests that the lawyer should sabotage the client’s 
purposes and engage in the “betrayal” of a client’s entirely legal projects.218  Presumably, the 
lawyer would have to conceal her planned betrayal from the client to get the client to sign up in 
the first place.  This sort of treachery would appear to be grossly at odds with any sort of ordinary 
morality, requiring a very high degree of role differentiation.  Luban, of course, generally finds 
role differentiation objectionable.
For Goldman in all cases and in cases where Luban does not think deceit is justified, what 
moral purpose is served by forcing the client to go elsewhere to obtain his desired result?  From 
216 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 131.  See also id. at 111-12, 128-31 (discussing possibility 
that allowing lawyers to veto client action will transfer power to legislate to lawyers).  Goldman 
does advert to the possibility that a lawyer “represents the only legal service or expertise in a 
particular area,” and agrees that that “may then be a relevant consideration as to whether he 
should substitute his moral conscience for legal guidelines.”  Id. at 130.
217 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 135; id. at 148 (making lawyers' individually accountable for 
their conduct means that "lawyers cannot singly prevent others from acting by refusing aid").  
The conclusion that the client will get help, either from the first lawyer or from another lawyer, is 
reinforced by Goldman’s willingness to allow the lawyer to “assume innocence in the absence of 
indubitable knowledge of guilt.”  Id. at 136.
218 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 174.
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 67
the perspective of society at large, it is difficult to see why the world in which the client gets a 
lawyer sympathetic to his arguably immoral end should be preferred to a world in which the 
client gets a lawyer unsympathetic to his immoral end.  On the contrary, it would seem that the 
unsympathetic lawyer might better restrain the client’s arguably immoral conduct.  
Luban pays little attention to this issue,219 and Goldman argues only that such a result is 
justified if something bad would otherwise happen to the character of the lawyer involved.220
Because Goldman does not explain this argument, neither Goldman nor Luban gives us any 
understanding of what moral values are served.  
Another observer, Heidi Li Feldman, suggests that the rules governing lawyers should 
facilitate the ethical deliberative process and that existing rules on legal ethics discourage ethical 
deliberations.221  Feldman does not care about results, because she is “[p]rimarily ... interested in 
the character of the lawyers’ ethical deliberations, rather than whether their actions were ethically 
219 Luban sometimes seems to be suggesting that his moral approach is one of clarification of 
terminology and deliberation, rather than one that will alter results:  “The point of the exercise, I 
suppose, is merely to get our moral ideas straight:  one less ideology is, after all, one less 
excuse.”  See Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 155, at 118.  
220 See GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 141 (the lawyer’s “refusal to violate a perceived moral 
right or cause serious harm to another is important for maintaining his own personal integrity”).  
See also id. at 132 (“the individual lawyer is maintaining his own autonomy”).
221 Heidi Li Feldman, Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 885 (1996).  
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correct,”222 and because a “skilled technocratic lawyer can create defensible legal arguments for 
almost any position, not in spite of black letter codes, but with their aid.”223
Thus, all three critiques of the contemporary system seem to have adopted, intentionally 
or by default, rules that have as their primary effect the consideration of moral factors by 
attorneys.  None of these critiques specifies why this goal is so important, and there are many 
reasons for rejecting this goal.
First, it is paternalistic to regulate attorneys on the basis of some, unspecified harm that 
will happen to attorneys’ character.  Attorneys remain free to decline cases if they fear that their 
character will be harmed or for any other reason.  To reject an attorney’s decision on this point 
seems wholly unjustified by the conclusory statements given by Luban, Goldman, and Feldman.
Second, the function of the legal system is not to provide a basis for moral introspection 
by attorneys, but reasonably economical justice for those dragged into the legal system, more or 
less involuntarily.  The attorney’s ethical deliberation comes at the expense of the client.  The 
cost may be small for a client with a new attorney and plenty of money to search for other 
attorneys, but clients with fewer resources or a satisfactory relationship with a lawyer will be 
222 Id. at 929.  
223 Feldman, supra note 221, at 898.  Others, of course, will disagree.  See, e.g., Martha 
Nussbaum, Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV.
714, 730 (1994).  Moreover, Feldman’s argument that deliberation itself is what is important 
seems inconsistent with her suggestion that “virtue is teleological—meant to serve a particular 
end or perform a certain function.”  Feldman, supra note 221, at 910.  From the context, in which 
Feldman compares the virtue of a knife in cutting to ethical deliberation, it is clear that Feldman 
thinks that ethical deliberation is a virtue.  Id.  In that case, it must have a purpose—but Feldman 
does not specify what that is.  
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forced to find a new lawyer and educate her about the client’s life or business, at great expense to 
the client.224
Third, an approach that emphasizes attorney “ethics” instead of adherence to law 
enhances the freedom of action of lawyers.  This allows lawyers more latitude to manipulate the 
legal system for their clients and for their own ends and gives sophisticated clients more access to 
these manipulative lawyers.  
Finally, an approach that relies on the ethics of lawyers gives lawyers more latitude to 
impose their ethical preferences on clients.  This disadvantages any group that does not share 
lawyers’ social characteristics, and it especially disadvantages groups that are not in a position to 
debate ethics on equal terms with lawyers.  
3. Conclusion 
 The absence of a detailed, shared morality means that the conflict that must be considered 
is not between the client’s morality and society’s morality, but between the client’s morality and 
the lawyer’s morality.  The lawyer’s acting as a check on the client’s desires will favor the 
preferences of lawyers, an elite subgroup of society, over those of clients.  To justify this 
conclusion, Goldman and Luban posit a situation in which the lawyer’s failure to adhere to the 
lawyer’s own morality would lead to radical injustice.  However, in a democratic society, an elite 
subgroup’s values are less likely to represent collective moral values than are the whole society’s 
laws.  
While Goldman and Luban advocate dialogue between lawyer and client, the lawyer’s 
ascendancy over the client and professional training in argument make it almost impossible to 
224 KAUFMAN, supra note 183, at 31-32. 
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imagine a dialogue between lawyer and client as equals.  Because of this, the lawyer can easily 
skew client preferences.
If the lawyer does not skew client preferences and the lawyer and the client remain at 
odds in their moral views, the client will simply seek another lawyer.  At times, this search may 
be unsuccessful.  Goldman and Luban view this as a case of a successful thwarting of a client’s 
immoral goals; I am less sanguine.  Most of the time, this search will be successful.  In this case, 
there will be no improvement in the results of the legal system, and perhaps even a loss when 
clients seek out lawyers who share their views and so cannot provide a moral review of the 
client’s desires.225
D. Incentives for Justice Within the Adversary System 
 The concern of Goldman, Luban, and Feldman for the moral character of lawyers may 
come from a belief that lawyers’ work is pervasively immoral, and that only moral monsters 
could carry out the functions of lawyers.  Indeed, the prevailing image of the lawyers’ work in the 
philosophical literature is of the lawyer as the presenter of immoral or downright dishonest 
claims.  
That view rests on mistaken assumptions about how legal practice works.  Morally 
monstrous claims will seldom succeed, partly because the legal system is largely consonant with 
225 Simon does suggest that where an ethically dubious “practice is widely available to 
people other than the client in question, considerations of horizontal equity may favor making it 
available to this client as well.”  Simon, supra note 6, at 1129.
The Ethics of the Adversary System
Page 71
common principles of morality.  Legally bizarre claims will fail for the same reason; that a 
lawyer could advance them does not mean that a lawyer will.226
Instead of a conflict between good and evil, legal disputes often take the form of the 
adjustment of inchoate claims between the parties.  The issue, especially in civil cases, is often 
better characterized as one, not of right and wrong, but of how much.  For example, in a tort case 
it may be undisputed that a party should pay damages; the question will be how much.  In a 
contract case, the words of the contract are undisputed; the question will be whether a party has 
satisfied (for example) the requirement that she use her best efforts and whether, if she has not, 
the other parties’ response to this failure is permissible under the contract.  Even when the 
damages are stipulated, and the only issue is liability, so that the case is in principle resolved 
without compromise, there may be a great deal to be said for both sides.
The legal system provides an orderly process for gathering the factual information to 
resolve these disputes.  The reason such a large portion of these disputes is resolved through 
negotiation is that the process is essentially a consensual one, albeit ultimately backed by the 
coercive power of the state.
In such a process, it is not accurate to say that one party has to be charged with 
representing an immoral position, even if the two parties have identical and comprehensive moral 
views.  Can we assert, when two parties negotiate a salary or the price of a home, that the 
position of at least one of the parties must be wrong?  If it is not morally wrong for someone to 
226 As another author has explained, “clients do not stand to benefit from outlandish legal 
positions.” Molot, supra n. 62 at 969.
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ask to be paid more money or to pay less money, can we assume so readily that one side in a 
legal dispute has to be regarded as being morally wrong?
This is even less true in a pluralistic society, when the parties cannot be charged with 
having the same moral code.  In that case, both may be acting morally according to their own 
views.  Thus, although an outsider to any lawsuit may believe one of the parties is morally 
wrong, it is simply not possible to conclude that at least one side in a lawsuit is acting in a 
morally wrong fashion according to her own standards.
Moreover, that two lawyers oppose each other does not mean that one thinks she is 
advancing a morally wrong claim.  Clients tend to find lawyers who genuinely do believe in 
them, and lawyers tend to prefer clients in whom they believe.227  Thus, although Wasserstrom 
observes that the charge of dissimulation can be advanced against lawyers more easily than 
against other professionals,228 this problem is largely hypothetical.  As Brandeis observed, “As a 
practical matter, I think the lawyer is not often harassed by this problem, partly because he is apt 
to believe at the time in most of the cases that he actually tries, and partly because he either 
abandons or settles a large number of those he does not believe in.”229
Because bystanders over-estimate the degree of duplicity required to be a lawyer, they 
tend to miss the ways in which the legal system encourages ethical conduct.  The major outlines 
of the legal system—people must do what they promise to do and pay for the damage they 
227 This effect is much less pronounced in the British system.  See supra note 197.
228 Wasserstrom, supra note 190, at 14.
229 Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 561 (1905).  See also
Nelson, supra note 180, at 526-27.
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cause—are completely in accord with everyday morality.  In a democracy, a departure from 
common morality will be rarer the more radical the departure is.230  Because the lawyer seeks to 
achieve goals in the framework of the legal system, very rarely will the ends the lawyer seeks be 
radically unjust.
It is sometimes argued that the legislature establishes general rules that are unjust in 
particular, such as the statute of frauds or the statute of limitations.231  However, these rules often 
seem unjust because they establish a bright-line rule, and those on the wrong side of the rule lose 
out entirely, even when they almost satisfy the requirements.  Against this, the bright-line rule 
provides advantages of certainty and predictability that maximize justice.  Failing to enforce 
them as bright-line rules destroys this benefit by requiring clients to persuade a lawyer that the 
application of the rule is ethically justified.  In the case of the statute of frauds, the opposing 
ethical claim to a remedy on the contract despite failing to satisfy the law’s procedural 
requirements for the validity of the contract cannot be very strong.  Moreover, the law provides 
alternative ways of recovery in case of reliance by the party who cannot show a contract or 
benefit to the party who denies the existence of a contract, minimizing the injustice.232  In the 
case of the statute of limitations, a lawyer’s denying a client the applicability of the statute will 
230 Of course, in instances where reciprocity exists, groups of people may tacitly or expressly 
adopt regimes differing from those in the larger community and enforce them through social 
sanctions.  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991).
231 See Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 155, at 88-89 (citing DAVID 
MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 152 (1973)).
232 In all the examples discussed in the text, if there is a conferral of benefits pursuant to the 
invalid contract, the party can recover the value of the benefits conferred.  E.g. RESTATEMENT 
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continue uncertainty over litigation for all people, even though lawsuits will not be filed in the 
vast majority of cases.
The need to present a case in a persuasive way forces the lawyer to confront the ethical 
views of the larger community.  Lawyers are unique among the professions in that much of their 
work will be judged by those outside the profession, whether jurors, who are complete non-
professionals, or judges, who have gone through professional education and experience, but who 
are largely removed from the financial self-interest of the profession.  Despite Goldman’s 
argument for strong role differentiation for judges,233 judges and juries generally like to do what 
is just, and precedent allows them to do so.  To be successful as an advocate, one must have the 
skill of persuading judges and juries why the result one wants is just.  The constant thinking in 
terms of applied justice that is required of a practicing lawyer tends to promote practical morality 
among lawyers.  Those lawyers who lack an understanding of common ethical standards will 
simply be unsuccessful.   Lawyers’ awareness of this may help explain why, as Richard 
Wasserstrom observes, criticisms of the lawyer’s role tend to be made by those outside the 
profession and rejected by those inside the profession.234
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 370, 375, 376 (1979).  See also id. § 139 (enforcing promises based 
on reliance, despite the statute of frauds).
j233 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 49.
234 Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals:  Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 
1 (1975).  See also GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 101-02 (“no experience in legal practice”); Luban, 
Lysistrata, supra note 165, at 637 (unnumbered footnote) (Luban does not have a law degree).  
Wasserstrom’s observation is still largely accurate, see M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to 
Philosophers About Legal Ethics?, 9 LAW & PHIL. 67, 70 & n.9 (1990), but some critics do have 
law degrees and practice to a limited extent while serving as professors, see Menkel-Meadow, 
supra n.4, at 6 (discussing her participation in three lawsuits as client and lawyer, in which she 
adhered to a fully adversary model).
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Lawyers’ need to maintain good client relations also contributes to the process of justice.  
Lawyers restrain clients’ demands to a standard of reasonableness, if only to increase the chance 
of success.235  Where a judge cannot compromise between two positions, as may be the case 
where specific performance is sought, an unreasonable proposal can easily be rejected.  Even in 
cases for damages, an extreme demand may preclude settlement and undercut credibility before 
judge and jury.  Clients may not be careful critics of lawyering, but they can tell if the result at 
trial is worse than a rejected settlement.  The lawyer whose conduct precludes settlement or who 
counsels clients to reject offers that turn out to be better than what the client receives at trial will 
lose clients.  Lawyers do not do this perfectly,236 but their professional training and experience 
allow them to develop the skill, and the structure of the adversary system gives them far more 
incentive for developing it than academics or those in other professions.  These incentives 
counteract the harmful effects of lawyers’ role.
In other respects, criticisms of lawyers’ roles seem to depend on a particular view of the 
legal system that may be flawed practically or a matter of contention normatively.  Richard 
Wasserstrom writes that lawyers “will be encouraged to be competitive rather than cooperative; 
aggressive rather than accommodating; ruthless rather than compassionate; and pragmatic rather 
than principled.”237
235 M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to Philosophers About Legal Ethics?, 9 LAW & 
PHIL. 67, 76 (1990); Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation:  Why Hardball Tactics Don’t Work, 
A.BA.J. 79 (March 1988).
236 CURTIS, supra note 134 at page 42, at 25; see also supra pp. 18-26.
237 Wasserstrom, supra note 190, at 13.
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As a practical matter, the lawyer who has only the traits Wasserstrom describes will have 
mixed success at best.  At times, competition is rewarded.  However, managing a case 
successfully also requires considerable cooperation with the opposing side.  A lawyer who cannot 
cooperate will run up fees and lose clients.238  Clinical studies show that overbearing behavior in 
trial is harmful to lawyers’ success.239  The aggressive lawyer who cannot see the strength of 
another side’s case will refuse to settle weak cases and lose clients.  
Wasserstrom’s conclusion that lawyering encourages pragmatism is likely correct.  
Wasserstrom fails to explain why he thinks that is bad.  Lawyers exist to serve clients.  The 
lawyer who spends her client’s money vindicating a principle rather than seeking a pragmatic 
solution is subject to legitimate criticism.  
Because Luban uses Lincoln as an example,240 it may be appropriate to turn to his life to 
indicate the evolution of the form of arguments lawyers make.  “In his earliest venture before the 
[Illinois Supreme Court], he based his case on the hairsplitting technicalities of which young 
238 Advocates who do not have clients, such as academics, are not constrained by them and 
may behave in the way Wasserstrom suggests.
239 Lance Stockwell & David C. Schneider, Factors That Persuade Jurors, 27 U. TOLEDO L. 
REV. 99, 108 (1995).
240 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 174 (“‘“You must remember that some 
things legally right are not morally right. We shall not take your case . . . .”’”  (quoting WILLIAM 
H. HERNDON & JESSE W. WEIK, HERNDON'S LINCOLN 345 n.* (Chicago, Belford, Clarke & Co. 
1889) (1888) (quoting letter written to William H. Herndon by eyewitness, recounting Lincoln's 
words)).  See also FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 239-40 (1912) (turning down 
a legal claim, because of the problems it would cause and advising the potential claimant to turn 
his energies in another direction); THE LIVING LINCOLN 143-45 (notes of July 1, 1850) (urging 
people not to stir up litigation, especially over land titles).  
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lawyers are so often fond.”241  As he grew more experienced, his arguments “less and less 
frequently depended on such technicalities.”242
This was not because Lincoln, as a mature lawyer or before, took only those cases that 
were consistent with his moral views.  Despite his career as an opponent of the extension of 
slavery, Lincoln at least once represented a slave owner who had brought slaves into Illinois from 
Kentucky, and argued in favor of keeping people enslaved in the free state of Illinois because 
they were merely being used in transit.243  Lincoln’s biographer, David Herbert Donald, argues 
that neither this case nor others in which Lincoln upheld the rights of those seeking freedom 
“should be taken as an indication of Lincoln’s views on slavery; his business was law, not 
morality.”244
Thus, despite Lincoln’s place in “the pantheon” of moral lawyers245 he did not follow his 
client’s moral views, even in matters of supreme importance.  That his legal career evolved 
towards making arguments that emphasized justice suggests that the legal system itself contains 
mechanisms to promote moral values in legal argumentation.  In any system that America is 
likely to adopt, those mechanisms will be more powerful in achieving both truth and justice than 
241 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 99 (1995).  
242 Donald, supra note 241, at 200.
243 Donald, supra note 241, at 103.  Lincoln lost the argument.  Id.
244 Id. at 104.  See also id. at 149 (“Like any other lawyer, he resorted to technicalities in 
order to save his clients....”); id. at 157 (Lincoln “had no consistent legal philosophy that he 
sought to push”; “[h]e sometimes argued for the railroads and sometimes represented their 
opponents”; “[h]e was, as Herndon said accurately but with undeserved censure, ‘purely and 
entirely a case lawyer.’”).
245 Atkinson, supra note 92, at 199 n.113.
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relying on the unmonitored contributions of lawyers towards those ends within the adversary 
system.
IV. CONFIDENTIALITY, ROLE DIFFERENTIATION, AND THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
 The preceding analysis has shown that adopting broader duties to disclose within the 
adversary system will have perverse results and shown that the adversary system has some often-
neglected incentives for just behavior.  It has not addressed at length the claim that the attorney-
client privilege is suspect because it is “role-differentiated,” that is, is immoral because it differs 
from the standards of behavior for others.246
A complete treatment of the issue of role-differentiation would go beyond this paper’s 
focus on the adversary system.   Nonetheless, attorney-client confidentiality is closely tied to the 
adversary system, and the claim that the attorney-client privilege is role differentiated and 
therefore ethically suspect is a staple of the debates over professional ethics.  Therefore, it is 
appropriate to addressing it separately here.247
246 See supra pp. 45-46 & nn. 146-147 (raising the issue of role differentiation).
247 The analysis here addresses on the lawyers’ activities within the adversary system.  This 
does not address the moral general issue of confidentiality beyond addressing the point of role-
differentiation, although other authors do this.  Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend:  The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Charles P. Curtis, The 
Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 8 (1951).  Thus, this argument does not address the 
morality of the lawyer’s role in preparing a will for a parent wishing to disinherit a child.  
Moreover, the adversary system provides its greatest incentives for conduct that conforms with 
justice in public argument.  Other areas have little or no incentive.
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Where confidentiality exists, it is sometimes argued that the lawyers’ role is differentiated 
from that of ordinary people.248  “Role differentiation” is used to describe situations in which a 
person does something that would ordinarily be considered immoral, but becomes moral because 
of the particular role that the person performing the action occupies.249
At first, the attorney-client privilege seems a clear example of role differentiation, 
because it prohibits the disclosure of past crimes revealed by the client in confidence,250 which 
most citizens would be permitted to reveal.  It also provides only a limited ability to disclose 
future crimes.251  This section of the paper will show, first, that the attorney-client privilege in 
litigation is required by the same analysis that shows the advantages of the adversary system 
generally, and second, that the attorney-client relationship is similar to other relationships in 
which concealment of information is expected or required.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege’s Relation to the Adversary 
System 
 Where the attorney-client privilege is asserted in connection with adversary litigation, the 
arguments against a general duty of disclosure apply equally well to sustain the privilege.  That 
is, a duty to disclose will undermine the truth-finding value of the adversary system and the 
248 Presumably, this claim is extended only to claims where the lawyers’ ability to keep client 
secrets is protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Otherwise, the lawyers’ legal obligations are 
similar to those of other agents, who are not to gossip about their principals’ affairs.
249 See, e.g., LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 155, at 1 (role morality is the theme for 
essays about the professional idea).
250 MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.6 (2004).  See also MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 4-101 (1980).
251 MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.6(b) (2004).
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advantages it is for the parties’ satisfaction with the legal system.252  Moreover, such a rule is 
likely to be disobeyed, because a breach of the duty will be difficult to detect, and the likely 
partial adherence to the rule will disadvantage those already disadvantaged by the legal system.253
Finally, taking such a rule seriously will require deceiving the parties to a case about their 
lawyers’ duties, which itself undermines justice.254
Courts recognize that maintaining a functioning adversary system requires protecting 
principles of confidentiality.255  Most obviously, without the incentive of control over the 
evidence discovered, parties would make fewer efforts to discover evidence, to the detriment of 
the truth-finding process.  More subtly, as Hickman observes, each side’s being constantly forced 
to inform the opposing side of its latest information would disrupt the trial-preparation 
process.256
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Other Socially Accepted 
Privileges 
 The support given to the attorney-client privilege from a consideration of the needs of an 
adversary system is also defensible on other grounds.  Contrary to what one might infer from 
some critics of the privilege, society accepts similar instances of role differentiation in other 
contexts.  
252 See supra pp. 16-19.
253 See supra pp. 19-38.
254 See supra pp. 38-43.
255 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1947).  See also id. at 516 (Jackson, J., 
concurring).
256 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1947). 
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One of the most dramatic examples of the attorney-client privilege was the so-called Lake 
Pleasant bodies case, in which two lawyers concealed their knowledge of the location of the 
bodies of two people killed by their client.257  This case caused outrage at the lawyers’ failure to 
disclose the information.258
In a comparatively recent case, a suspect in the murder of three young boys was taped 
while confessing to a priest.259  In neither this case nor the Lake Pleasant case did the holder of 
the confidential information present false evidence.  In both cases, the suppression of the 
evidence would cause harm.  Here, however, the outrage was at the taping and not at the priest’s 
concealment of information that would allow a multiple murderer to go free.260
In many respects, the lawyer is less role differentiated than the priest.  Lawyers cannot 
present false evidence to a court and, under the Model Rules adopted in most states, must correct 
257 See People v. Belge, 50 A.D. 2d 1088 (N.Y. App. 1975), aff’d 41 NY2d 60 (1976); . For 
discussion of the bodies case, see, e.g., Feldman, supra note 221, at 889-904; Chamberlain, 
Legal Ethics, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 211 (1975).
258 Bryce Nelson, Ethical Dilemma:  Should Lawyers Turn in Clients?, Los Angeles Times, 
July 2, 1974, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in ANDREW L. KAUFMAN & DAVID B. WILKINS, PROBLEMS IN 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION 199 (4th ed. 2002).
259 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 524-36 (1997) (collecting materials relating to the case); 
Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting the confessor’s request for an 
injunction).
260 See Celestine Bohlen, Vatican Wants Tape of Jail Confession Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 1996, at A26.
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such false evidence if offered.261  By contrast, we do not permit, much less require, that priests 
inform the courts when a party asserts a position inconsistent with his confession.262
We may find the priest-penitent privilege acceptable because we believe that a penitent 
would be mistreated if something he said in confidence were used against him and because we 
believe that if the privilege did not exist, communications would be cut off, leaving society no 
better off.  Much the same arguments apply to lawyers dealing with past conduct, at least so as to 
require a far more persuasive justification for a regime of truth-promotion than it seems possible 
to advance.
If, on the other hand, the priest-penitent privilege is based on a cost-benefit analysis, 
determining whether the lawyer-client confidentiality should continue would require comparing 
the costs and benefits of several privileges.  Lawyers provide several social advantages in the 
judicial process.  By virtue of the existing ethical rules, they restrain clients from presenting false 
evidence.263  Lawyers also provide the parties with representation by people who have less 
emotional involvement in the issues.264  Lawyers may also use confidentiality and the client’s 
trust to persuade a client not to undertake a wrongful course of action that would harm others.265
If we want lawyers to serve as intermediaries in the parties’ relations with one another and the 
261 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3.3 (2004).
262 See John J. Montone III, Comment, In Search of Forgiveness: State v. Szemple and the 
Priest-Penitent Privilege in New Jersey, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 263 (1995).
263 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.2 (d), 3.3 (2004).
264 Wasserstrom, supra note 190, at 17.  This suggests that the lawyer as lawbook rationale is 
not a complete explanation of the lawyer's function.  
265 See KAUFMAN, supra note 183, at 778.  
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court, it may be a necessary to allow the client to choose the intermediaries and to allow a certain 
realm of confidentiality in which the client can treat the lawyer as the client’s own self.  
It could be argued that because the lawyer is part of a legal system that has justice as its 
goal, using the attorney-client privilege to exclude a confession is more incongruous than the use 
of the priest-penitent privilege to achieve the same result.  However, this argument is not 
available to those who oppose role differentiation, because it argues that the lawyers’ moral 
responsibilities ought to be different—in this case, greater—because of the role that the lawyer 
occupies in society.  
Moreover, role differentiation in a particular case will often undercut the goal said to be 
advanced by the rule requiring role differentiation.  For example, the goal behind the doctor-
patient privilege is to promote health by encouraging a patient to seek needed medical treatment.  
However, when a hospital was not allowed to inform one spouse that his wife is HIV-positive, 
thereby jeopardizing the health of the HIV-negative spouse, the case attracted no comment.266
Interestingly, failure to disclose a life-threatening condition is something that has 
occurred in medical work, as well as in legal work.  In the famous Spaulding case, the plaintiff 
had unbeknownst to him, a life threatening condition, which neither the defendants’ examining 
266 N.O.L. v. District of Columbia, 674 A.2d 498, 499 (D.C. App. 1995).  
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physician nor their attorney disclosed.267  The failure of the lawyer to disclose the information 
attracted negative comment, but the conduct of the physician largely escaped notice.268
A somewhat analogous situation occurred in psychiatry, in which a Nazi sought 
psychiatric treatment to avoid “feeling guilt for beating up enemies of the Nazis, particularly 
Jews.”269  It was suggested that a therapist could take the case with the goal of curing the Nazi so 
that he would not want to be violently aggressive.270   Sigmund Freud and Bruno Bettelheim 
rejected this approach, because of the dishonesty involved.271  Such a dilemma will rarely await a 
lawyer, because of the need for the lawyer to advance her claim through the legal system.272  It 
might be wisest to leave such an extreme case to civil disobedience, instead of giving lawyers a 
general license to lie to their clients.273
My purpose in discussing these cases is not to claim that lawyers should always have 
confidentiality, merely to make the point that rules of confidentiality are widely accepted for 
some non-lawyers.  As compared with these non-lawyers, the lawyer’s role is not differentiated.  
267 Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).  In that case, neither defense 
counsel nor the defense physician disclosed to the plaintiff the imminent risk of death caused by 
an aortal aneurysm that plaintiff’s physician did not detect.  Id. at 710.  
268 Interestingly, Luban cites this as a case of a failure of the lawyer, and not as a joint failure 
of the lawyer and physician.  Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 155, at 115.
269 BRUNO BETTELHEIM & ALVIN A. ROSENFELD, THE ART OF THE OBVIOUS 216 (1993).
270 Id.
271 Id.    Cf. BETTELHEIM & ROSENFELD, supra note 269, at 235 (discussing the difficulties in 
establishing a patient’s trust for the therapist).
272 But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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Moreover, the adversary system does provide benefits to society.  Thus, although some have seen 
the attorney-client privilege as explicable merely in terms of attorneys’ selfish interest,274 this is 
simply incorrect.
C. Some Distinctions 
 There are a variety of justifications for the attorney-client privilege.  We have discussed 
the adversary system here.  
This justification by itself provides no reason for the privilege to apply in negotiations or 
other non-adversary situations.275  It might be thought that this justification was not significant, 
because of a variety of other justifications for the attorney-client privilege have broader results.  
A brief consideration of these other approaches suggests, however, sufficient weaknesses 
with them that a justification based on the adversary system is an important component of the 
overall justification for the attorney-client privilege.
One of these other justifications relies upon the relationship between the lawyer and the 
client.  For example, Charles Fried's lawyer-as-friend approach analogizes the lawyer-client to a 
relationship, friendship, that has an independent justification.276  Charles Curtis describes 
273 KAUFMAN, supra note 183, at 780.
274 See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1998).
275 To some extent, the rules reflect this.  MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
3.3(d) (2004) requires the lawyer for the represented party to inform the tribunal of all relevant 
facts to permit the tribunal to make "an informed decision."  The comment says, "The judge has 
an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration.  The lawyer for the 
represented party has the correlative duty to make relevant disclosures."  For consideration of the 
extension of this approach, see KAUFMAN, supra note 183, 178-79.)
276 Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend:  The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).  
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lawyering as an intimate relation, like other relationships, such as marriage, in which one would 
lie for another.277
Unfortunately, justifications based on relationships tend to be circular.  We tend to 
ascribe properties to a relationship based on what it is, rather than re-evaluating the relationship 
as a whole, so describing attorney-client privilege as a form of friendship begs the question.  Real 
friendship has a justification that pre-exists the legal system.278  Moreover, an analogy between 
the lawyer and friend does not advance the argument for confidentiality, because the "law entitles 
friends, as such, to awesomely little protection against the inquisitiveness of the State."279
A third justification for the attorney-client privilege is to minimize the difference in truth-
revealing between someone who consults an attorney and someone who does not.280  This 
standard reflects the “lawyer as lawbook analysis,” sometimes also ascribed to the desire to 
preserve client autonomy.281
The difficulty with this analysis is that, unless it is qualified by limiting it to cases in 
which the client wants a legally or morally permissible goal, it lacks any social or moral 
277 Charles Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 8 (1951).
278 ALAN GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 96 (1982).
279 GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 154-44; Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the 
Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 640.
280
“Minimize,” rather than “eliminate,” because ethics rules require attorneys not to do 
things for clients that a dishonest client could do for herself and other ethics rules permit 
attorneys to reveal dishonesty that a dishonest client would not. 
281 Stephen Pepper, Why Confidentiality?, 23 L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 331, 334 (1998).
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justification.  Just because an attorney can evade the law does not mean that it is right for him to 
do so.  But if the attorney has no right to it, surely the client cannot either.  
The same reasoning may be clearer in an analogous context.  Consider the analogous 
doctor-patient privilege:  If we cast this privilege in terms of autonomy, we would say that the 
purpose of the privilege is to allow the patient to do that which he cannot do without the medical 
information of the physician.  Is the physician thereby allowed to advise the patient on especially 
effective techniques for poisoning?
Even where the privilege in such a case allows the entity consulting with the lawyer to 
comply with the law, it is not always the case that this will be a social gain.  For example,
suppose a corporation consults with a lawyer on its duty to comply with the immigration laws.  
The lawyer advises the client that the corporation will violate the law by using undocumented 
aliens, but that the corporation will comply with the law by hiring independent contractors that 
employ undocumented aliens.  The corporation acts accordingly.  It has complied with the law, 
but there is no advantage to society from its having done so.
The need to obtain legal advice in an increasingly complex body of laws, commonly cited 
as a justification for a broad attorney-client privilege,282 in fact may undermine the privilege.   If 
legal advice is essential, it will be obtained with or without the privilege, so the privilege fails the 
Wigmorean principle that the privilege be necessary for the existence of the communication 
protected by the privilege.  Although the argument made here was made by the government and 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States,283 there seems to be little in 
282 E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1981).
283 449 U.S. 383, 393 n.2 (1981).
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principle to justify that rejection.284  This is especially true in circumstances such as Upjohn, in 
which the corporation sought to conceal documents reflecting communications between a 
corporate attorney and lower-level corporate employees,285 and the ability to conceal the 
information allows for considerable coaching of witnesses to alter the facts that another 
investigator later finds.286  Such concealment is especially a problem in the case of corporate 
wrongdoing, where the extension of the privilege to all corporate employees means that many or 
all of the fact-witnesses will be clients.
It is perhaps not surprising that the strongest arguments in favor of the attorney-client 
privilege can be made in the area of adversary litigation.  This is in fact the original function of 
the attorney-client privilege, which was confined to the case in which the attorney was retained, 
and only subsequently extended “to include communications made, first during any other 
284 See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1998).
285 449 U.S. at 388.
286 The ability of the lawyer to coach witnesses, protected by the privilege, undermines the 
Court’s statement, 
Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications 
such as those involved here, however, puts the adversary in no 
worse position than if the communications had never taken place. 
The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does 
not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who 
communicated with the attorney.
449 U.S. at 395.  In Upjohn itself, much of the information was submitted to the attorney in 
writing, id. at 388, making inapplicable Hickman’s strong prohibitions against requiring attorneys 
to supply their recollections of witnesses’ testimony, see 329 U.S. at 508-09.  This also limited 
the ability of the attorney to coach the witnesses before collecting evidence.  The broad language 
of the Court’s opinion, of course, will not require these limitations to be present in future cases in 
which the privilege is available.
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litigation; next, in contemplation of litigation; next, during a controversy but not yet looking to 
litigation; and, lastly, in any consultation for legal advice, wholly irrespective of litigation or 
even of controversy.”287
The “attorney-client privilege” may be, to use Wittgenstein's simile, like a rope the 
strength of which comes not from one strand that extends the length of the rope, but from many 
strands that overlap.288   The varying degrees of justification overlap, but some are much stronger 
than others.  Questions about the desirability of the privilege in some contexts, such as when 
attorneys help clients with their future conduct, should not undermine the applicability in 
contexts where the purposes behind the privilege are more fully met.  
V. ALTERNATIVES TO EXTENDED DUTIES TO DISCLOSE 
 Declining to create an ethical duty for lawyers does not leave the system remediless.  
First, lawyers can already consider their client's deceptive conduct and refuse to represent a client 
or, having accepted a client, may refuse to present evidence they reasonably believe evidence to 
be false.289  These rules protect lawyers' interests in avoiding the abuse of their services.
287
 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).  Cf. EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES §§ 2.3 
- 2.4 (2002) (generally recounting the Wigmorean analysis); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 
510 n.9 (1947) (discussing the British interpretation of attorney-client privilege to cover pre-trial 
preparation materials).
288 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, ¶ 67 (G.E.M Anscombe trans. 
3d ed. 1958).
289 MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3.3(c) (1983). Cf. MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(4) (1980) (lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the 
lawyer knows to be false).
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Second, existing discovery rules provide some avenues for allowing that narrow the 
chance that the concealment of evidence will succeed.  By limiting the incentives for deception, 
these rules decrease its likelihood.  These rules apply equally to lawyers and clients, removing 
some of the incentive to hire unethical lawyers that a duty that applied only to lawyers would 
create.  These rules are under-enforced, but it seems unlikely that adding a new layer of ethical 
rules would address the problem more effectively than enforcement of existing rules.  Judges 
need to overcome their frequently expressed reluctance to intervene in discovery290 and their 
reluctance to award compensatory sanctions when discovery abuse is found.291
If the rules for discovery are insufficient, they can be changed by adding inquisitorial 
investigations to the system without imposing conflicting duties on existing attorneys.  The rules 
already allow for this:  courts can appoint amicus curiae and expert witnesses.292  If that is 
insufficient, the legislature can arrange for inquisitorial investigations generally or prosecutors.  
290 E.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 217, 266.  
See also Wayne D. Brazil, Ethical Perspectives on Discovery Reform, 3 REV. LITIG. 51, 62-87 
(1982-1983) (discussing the origins of attorneys’ willingness to engage in discovery abuse).
291 Nesson, supra note 69 at 796-97 (“Nor are judges disposed to press intimations of 
unethical conduct when the alleged impropriety has not caused any lasting harm. The judge who 
is overseeing the discovery process (or, more likely, the magistrate) will likely tell the victim's 
lawyer, ‘You've got the evidence. Now get on with it.’"); Barbara J. Gorham, Note, Fisons: Will 
It Tame the Beast of Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 765, 786 (1994); John W. 
Heiderscheit, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions in the Ninth Circuit:  The Collapse of the Deterrence 
Goal, 68 OR. L. REV. 57, 77 (1989); 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 190 (“[B]ecause discovery abuse is 
mostly rational, deliberate, economically motivated behavior, efforts to eliminate such behavior 
must focus on the incentives that lead lawyers and their clients to engage in it.”).  See also
Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Co., 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (requiring proof of 
discovery abuse by “clear and convincing” evidence).
292 FED. R. EVID. 706.
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All such remedies avoid the dueling loyalties that a proposal to give lawyers a duty to promote 
truth would create.
Third, procedures to prevent the initial corruption of evidence can co-exist with the 
adversary system as we know it.  With respect to documentary evidence, evidence of regular 
document destruction programs should not be concealed from jurors, even if the document 
destruction was not directed to the particular case. 
Steps can be taken to minimize the contribution of lawyers to the inevitable 
reconstruction and mutation of witnesses’ memory.293  The British system prohibits its trial 
attorneys coaching or rehearsing a witness294 and helps enforce this by barring barristers from 
interviewing most witnesses in a criminal case295 and from interviewing witnesses in civil cases 
before the solicitor has prepared a proof from that witness and requiring that the interview take 
place in the presence of the solicitor or her representative.296
The principle behind this is that “if we are to run a system of oral testimony in an 
adversarial process, we need to insure so far as is possible that the given testimony is the 
testimony of the witness and not the result of the advocate’s interrogation of the witness in 
293 See FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 59-77
(discussing the role of lawyers in interviewing and counseling clients).  See also Frankel, supra
note 23, at 1054 (advocating “freezing” evidence to prevent further tampering).
294 Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales 607.3.
295 Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales 607.1.
296 Id.; Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales 607.2.  However, Freedman 
suggests that this simply allows the solicitor to contaminate the client without the barrister’s 
knowledge, and that the division of labor between the two branches of the profession allows each 
side to avoid moral responsibility for the ultimate result of perjury. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' 
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 109. 
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circumstances in which the witness is liable to seek to adopt the advocate’s perception of the 
events rather than his own recollection of those events.”297
 The German system also has been said by some to minimize the possibility of lawyer 
contamination of witnesses.298  However, even on the best of facts, the inquisitorial system will 
not achieve all that is claimed for it.  Although the in-court questioning of witnesses is done by 
the judge, reducing the problem of harassing witnesses (but increasing the problem that the 
witnesses will provide evidence that simply reinforces the judge’s existing prejudices), the out-
of-court contamination of witnesses and documents can proceed unchecked.  Indeed, although we 
think the coaching witnesses in the Anatomy of a Murder situation299 exemplifies the adversary 
system, Gogol described a similar coaching in a civil law system over 100 years earlier in Dead 
Souls.300
297 Ethics Forum and Debate:  Rules of Conduct for Counsel and Judges:  A Panel 
Discussion on English and American Practices, 7 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 865, 869 (1994).  
However, Monroe Freedman suggests that this simply allows the solicitor to contaminate the 
client without the barrister’s knowledge, and that the divison of labor betwen the two branches of 
the profession allow each side to avoid moral responsibility for the ultimate result of perjury.  
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 109. An additional 
reason for not rehearsing stories is that the rehearsal gives even a well-meaning lawyer more 
opportunity to impose her view on her client.  See White, supra note 194, at 39.  
298 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 96-97.
299 See supra note 69.
300 NIKOLAI GOGOL, DEAD SOULS 358-61 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volkhonsky trans., 
1996) (1842).  In this episode of Dead Souls, Chichikov has forged and put into probate a will, a 
plan that may be frustrated by the failure of the forged will to revoke the genuine, prior will, 
which has just turned up.  Id. at 359.  Chichikov goes to see a lawyer known for evading the 
many suspicions against him.  Id. at 359-60.    After negotiating compensation, id. at 360, the 
lawyer says, 
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Third, we can provide protection for lawyers from the demands of clients.  Some courts 
have provided similar protection for lawyers,301 suggesting that they may advance the duty of the 
lawyer to inform.302  Of course, even such a duty to inform may discourage clients from hiring 
lawyers in the first place; avoiding accountants is not a practical alternative for those seeking 
money in the securities markets, and accountants receive some protection from firing.303
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Various critiques of lawyering suggest modifying the current system, in which the goal of 
the lawyer is to represent the client, by adopting a goal of truth or justice.  These arguments for 
“If I may, instead of starting a long case, you probably did not 
examine the will very well:  there’s probably some sort of little 
addition.  Take it home for a while.  Though, of course, it’s 
prohibited to take such things home, still, if you ask certain 
officials nicely …  I, for my part, will exercise my concern.”  
“I see,” thought Chichikov, and he said:  “In fact, I really don’t 
remember very well whether there was a little addition or not”—as 
if he had not written the will himself.
Id. (ellipses in the original).  The lawyer continues by giving advice on the advantages of relying 
solely on documentary evidence and on the benefits of confusing the case.  Id. at 360-62.
301 General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 497-98, 501 (Cal. 1994) 
(allowing the action); GTE Prods. Crop. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161, 166-67 (Mass. 1995); 
Chandra R. Coblentz, Note, The Impact of General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court on the 
Evolving Tort of Retaliatory Discharge for In-House Attorneys, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 991, 
1011 (1995).  Contra Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 145 Ill.2d 492, 501, 164 Ill.Dec. 892, 584 N.E.2d 
104 (1991)
302 See Jeffrey P. Kerrane, Will Tarasoff Liability be Extended to Attorneys in Light of New 
California Evidence Code Section 956.5?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 825 (1995).
303 See Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1996) 
(sustaining public policy objection to firing based on a rule requiring accountants not to falsify 
information); Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyers Disclosure of Corporate 
Fraud:  Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225-276 (1996).
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improving the adversary system are flawed because they ignore the incentives that lawyers and 
clients have for ignoring changed rules.  Because of this, individual lawyers and clients will 
choose not to follow these substitutions, and as a result, the changes would harm their ostensible 
goal, producing truth or producing justice.  Moreover, these changes would disadvantage the 
least powerful members of society, by requiring clients to survive the gate-keeping activities of 
lawyers.  Their only arguably positive effect is to increase lawyer deliberation on ethical issues.  
If the purpose of discussion is to change behavior to make the world a better place, rather 
than merely to label conduct as ethical or unethical, these critiques of the adversary system are 
unsound.304  Moreover, the critique based on the failings of the adversary system is at odds with a 
critique of lawyers as elitists who dominate clients and treat them paternalistically.305
The dilemma posed by the adversary system is that it requires its participants to behave in 
a fashion that would be unacceptable for an individual for the system to achieve a just result.  
Bernard Williams has suggested that the moral problem for lawyers and politicians is one of 
304 Cf. Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-
Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best-World:  The Whys and Some 
Therefores, 46 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 316, 319 (1996) (“This article seeks not just to 
understand the world but to change it....”) (paraphrasing Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, No. 
11, in FREDERICK ENGELS, LUDWIG FEUERBACH appx. (London:  1889), reprinted in KARL 
MARX, WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 403 (Loyd D. Easton &
Kurt H. Guddat eds. & trans., 1967) ("The Philosophers up to now have only interpreted the 
world in various ways; the point is to change it.")). 
305 See Wasserstrom, supra note 190, at 1 (making both criticisms).
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“dirty hands.”  This is the problem of the person, wanting to achieve something good, who has to 
do something bad in order to achieve the good.306
The moral problem of lawyers is actually more profound than that.  In the case of dirty 
hands, a person wants to achieve the good, but must use deplorable means.  Lawyers’ goal is 
often to achieve their clients’ selfish ends instead of the good, and only through the genius of the 
system are these bad desires made to serve social ends.  
To put the best face on it, the adversary system and its checks and balances adopt the 
Madisonian "policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives."307
Unfortunately for lawyers, the same analysis suggests a less flattering description of the lawyers 
in the adversary system, Mephistopheles’ self-description in Goethe’s Faust as “a part of that 
power which always wills evil and always works good.”308
However, the comparison with Mephistopheles is not entirely apt.  Lawyers’ power to do 
evil is much more limited than Mephistopheles’.  The system itself, by providing judges and 
jurors with the capacity to consider justice in their decisions, not only forces lawyers to argue 
cases in terms of justice, it provides lawyers with an incentive to cultivate a sense of justice.  As 
a result, despite the moral hazards of differentiated conduct, lawyers are probably neither much 
better nor much worse than their fellow citizens.  
306 See Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 
66, 71 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).  See also BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 93 (1972).
307 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
308 JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUST , Pt. 1, ll. 1335-36 (1808) (“Ein Teil von jener 
Kraft/Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.”), reprinted in, e.g. , 3 JOHANN 
WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, WERKE 1, 47 (Christian Verner Verlag 1949).
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The ultimate conclusion on the adversary system and the lawyers in it, then, must be 
Madisonian:  “It may be a reflection of human nature that such devices should be necessary to 
control the abuses of Government.  But what is Government itself, but the greatest of all 
reflections on human nature?”309
309 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
